Dinamika Posisi Indonesia terhadap Hukum Internasional

Dimuat di OPINI JURIS KEMLU RI, Vol. 15, Januari-April 2014

Damos Dumoli Agusman

A  Pendahuluan       

Pakar hukum Belanda, Lambertus Erades, pernah mengekpresikan kegelisahannya bahwa “the relation between international law and municipal law is a subject with which many generations of lawyers have wrestled, are wrestling and will continue to wrestle”.[1]  Para pakar hukum telah lama berdebat soal bagaimana hubungan kedua bidang hukum ini yang akhirnya melahirkan teori legendaris yang disebut dengan monisme dan dualisme dan berlanjut dengan derivatif-nya yaitu teori adopsi dan transformasi. Studi tentang hubungan kedua hukum ini sudah banyak, tidak hanya soal interaksi antara kedua hukum ini namun juga menguak konflik diantara keduanya. Namun sayangnya, studi ini masih terbatas pada negara-negara modern^[2] dan belum banyak mengkaji sistem-sistem hukum di negara-negara berkembang. Belum banyak terkuak bagaimana hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional di negara-negara baru yang lahir setelah PD II dan yang melepaskan diri tradisi hukum kolonial-nya  seperti Indonesia.^[3]

Negara-negara bekas koloni, yang mewariskan sistem hukum negara penjajahnya, lebih gampang menjelaskan hubungan kedua hukum ini karena negara-negara ini cenderung mewarisi sistem hukum yang dianut oleh negara penjajahnya yang telah menyediakan doktrin untuk persoalan ini.[4]  Bekas jajahan Inggris akan serta merta mewarisi sistem common law yang telah menyediakan doktrin untuk persoalan hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional yang cenderung menganut dualisme, namun untuk Indonesia persoalan ini tampaknya belum jelas.^[5]

Indonesia adalah negara baru yang memperoleh kemerdekaannya dan pejajahan Belanda dengan perjuangan pahit. Akibatnya, Indonesia cenderung anti penjajah dan menjadi tidak antusias mengadopsi tradisi hukum Belanda sehingga cenderung membangun sistem hukumnya sendiri.[6] Bagi Indonesia, secara historis hukum internasional adalah pro establishement yang memberi legitimasi bagi negara penjajah untuk terus menjajah negara jajahannya. Hukum internasional pada waktu itu menjadi sangat tidak bersahabat bagi Indonesia. Itulah sebabnya, hukum internasional menjadi agak asing bagi sistem Indonesia dan menjadi elemen yang cenderung baru dalam arsitektur hukum Indonesia. Akibatnya, bagaimana sistem hukum Indonesia menyikapi hukum internasional khususnya perjanjian internasional belum mendapatkan perhatian dalam sistem hukum ini.^[7]

Persoalan tentang hubungan perjanjian internasional dan hukum nasional menjadi sangat menarik dan unik. Pengalaman sejarah Indonesia sedikit banyak dapat menjelaskan relasi ini. Indonesia melepaskan diri dari sistem kolonialisme Belanda yang waktu itu dilabelkan sebagai dunia Barat, dunia yang menciptakan “hukum internasional”. Tradisi Indonesia sudah diwarnai oleh sentime nasionalisme, resistensi dan perlawanan terhadap apa yang diyakini sebagai “hukum internasional kolonial”. Persepsi dan tradisi ini, seperti kata  Ko Swan Sik[8] akan mewarnai sikap Indonesia terhadap hukum internasional.

Indonesia memisahkan diri dari Belanda dengan cara revolusioner dan dengan demikian menolak mewarisi tradisi hukum Belanda  tentang hukum internasional.^[9] Indonesia membangun sistem hukumnya sendiri dan menetapkan sikap tersendiri terhadap hukum internasional. Sekalipun mempertahankan tradisi civil law  Belanda, Indonesia merumuskan UUD-nya sendiri setelah kemerdekaan.

Sejak kemerdekaan, Indonesia berjuang keras untuk memperoleh pengakuan internasional yang akhirnya diperoleh pada tahun 1949. Setelah itu, Indonesia mengalami 3 periode rejim pemerintahan, pertama disebut dengan ‘order lama’^[10] yang ditandai dengan sistem demokrasi terpimpin oleh Presiden Sukarno yang sangat dominan dalam politik nasional. Pada awalnya Presiden Sukarno berorientasi pada demokrasi namun lambat laun mengarah pada pelanggengan kekuasaan yang ditandai dengan istilah Presiden seumur hidup.  Krisis ekonomi pada tahun 1960-an menggiring keruntuhan rejim ini dan selanjutnya diganti dengan rejim ‘orde baru’ yang dipimpin oleh pemerintahan militer Presiden Soeharto.  Krisis ekonomi yang sama terjadi pada tahun 1998 dan juga memaksa rejim orde baru ini mengakhiri kekuasaannya yang kemudian diganti dengan rejim ketiga yaitu rejim ‘reformasi’ yang menguasai sampai saat ini.

Pada masa rejim otoritarian baik orde lama maupun orde baru, perdebatan tentang hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional tidak berkembang.  Sistem politik yang dominan pada waktu itu dengan serta merta akan memberikan jawaban politik terhadap persoalan juridis ini. Persoalan ini tidak kontroversial dan tidak merangsang publik untuk membahas persoalan ini dari segi hukum. Namun di era reformasi pertanyaan tentang status hukum dari suatu perjanjian internasional di dalam sistem hukum Indonesia sudah mulai mencuat. Pertanyaan ini lahir karena tekanan dari dua arah secara bersamaan yaitu internal maupun eksternal.  Secara internal, Indonesia mulai mempraktekkan demokrasi modern yang harus ditandai dengan prinsip rule of law, partisipasi parlemen, pembagian kekuasaan dan kepastian hukum. Prinsip-prinsip demokrasi ini menuntut adanya ketegasan hukum tentang status suatu perjanjian internasional dalam sistem hukum.

 Tekanan eksternal terjadi akibat globalisasi. Ciri utama dari globalisasi adalah semakin kaburnya batas perbedaan antara hukum internasional dan hukum nasional. Dewasa ini telah lahir banya perjanjian internasional yang bersifat intrusif ke hukum nasional seperti perjanjian tentang lingkungan hiudp, HAM dan perdagangan. Sifat intrusif dari perjanjian ini telah mendorong para pakar Indonesia untuk menemukan jawaban terhadap status perjanjian ini dalam kaca mata hukum nasional.

B. Respon Indonesia terhadap Hukum Internasional

1) Sikap Permusuhan (1945-1966)

Indonesia memiliki sikap yang sama dengan negara-negara Asia pada umumnya terhadap hukum internasional, yakni selektif: memilih norma hukum internasional yang bermanfaat bagi perjuangannya dan menolak norma yang merugikannya.[11] Sikap ini selaras dengan pengalaman sejarahnya yang melihat hukum internasional sangat menguntungkan negara penjajah dan sebaliknya merugikan setiap negara yang hendak merdeka karena karakternya yang  ‘separatism”.^[12] Sentimen ini telah mendorong para pendiri bangsa untuk mencap bahwa kolonialisme adalah dunia Barat si pencipta hukum internasional.  Hukum ini menjustifikasi penundukan bangsa Asia Afrika terhadap kolonialisme.^[13] Sebaliknya, proklamasi kemerdekaan oleh dunia Barat dituduh sebagai tindakan sepihak yang melanggar hukum internasional.[14]

Berakhirnya perang kemerdekaan ditandai dengan pembentukan the Netherlands-Indonesia Union pada tahun 1949 dan sejak itu sikap Indonesia terhadap hukum internasional berorientasi pada Belanda yakni sangat bersahabat. Namun sikap bersahabat ini hanya berlansung singkat karena sejak 1950 Indonesia memutuskan secara sepihak Konferensi Meja Mundar 1949, yang waktu itu dikritik sebagai melanggar hukum internasional. Sejak itu, seiring dengan memburuknya hubungan Indonesia dengan Belanda, sikap anti Barat semakin menguat dan cenderung menjadi identik dengan sikap anti hukum internasional. Sikap Indonesia menjadi sangat anti Barat dan cenderung membangkitkan semangat revolusi yang pernah dikobarkan pada era perang kemerdekaan.^[15] Akibatnya, sentimen ini berimbas pada sikap yang sama yaitu anti terhadap hukum internasional.

Beberapa kebijakan Indonesia pada era ini sangat sarat dengan perlawanan terhadap hukum internasional. Pada tahun 1957, kekecawaan Indonesia terhadap PBB semakin memuncak  karena PBB dianggap tidak lagi membantu Indonesia dalam pertikaian dengan Belanda atas Irian Barat sehingga pada tahun 1958 Indonesia mengeluarkan PP No. 23 tahun 1958 yang menasionalisasikan semua Perusahaan Belanda di Indonesia. Berdasarkan penjelasan dari PP ini, kebijakan ini diambil dalam rangka penyelamatan kelangsungan dan kelancaran ekonomi akibat perjuangan pembebasan Irian Barat. Kebijakan nasionalisasi ini telah menimbulkan kontroversi dan melahirkan gugatan terhadap Indonesia di pengadilan Jerman.^[16] Para pakar hukum internasional juga angka bicara mengkritisi kebijakan ini sebagai pelanggaran terhadap hukum internasional.^[17]  Pakar hukum internasional Mochtar Kusumaatmadja sendiri mengakui bahwa kebijakan ini prima facie bertentangan dengan hukum internasional tentang perlindungan warga asing beserta propertinya.^[18]

Resistensi Indonesia terhadap hukum internasional memuncak pada waktu munculnya ancaman strategis yang diakibatkan oleh hukum laut yang berlaku pada saat itu. Lebar laut yang hanya diperkenankan 3 mil telah mengakibatkan Indonesia dipisahkan oleh laut bebas dan membuka ruang bagi kebebasan kapal-kapal perang Belanda di tengah-tengah perebutan Irian Barat. Akibatnya Indonesia melihat hukum laut yang berlaku saat itu sangat merugikan kelangsungan hidup Indonesia karena wilayah Indonesia menjadi tercerai berai dan sangat rawan terhadap disintegrasi oleh daerah-daerah yang pada waktu itu cenderung menguat. Ancaman ini menimbulkan persoalan ketahan dan keamanan negara dan semakin meningkatkan sentimen negatif bahwa hukum internasional tidak adil.^[19]

Sebagai reaksi terhadap ketidakadilan hukum laut ini maka pada tahun 1957 Indonesia mengeluarkan deklarasi unilateral yang terkenal dengan Deklarasi Djuanda. Deklarasi ini menegaskan bahwa laut yang berada diantara pulau-pulau adalah laut yang menghubungkan pulau-pulau ketimbang memisahkannya. Untuk itu, Deklarasi menetapkan penarikan garis pangkal lurus yang menghubungkan titik-titik terluar dari pulau-pulau terluar dan selanjutnya mengklaim bahwa perairan didalamnya yang semula adalah laut bebas menjadi perairan pedalaman. Deklarasi ini tentu saja mengundang protes keras dari negara-negara Barat^[20] khususnya Amerika Serikat^[21]  yang menganggap Deklarasi ini  sebagai pelanggaran terhadap hukum internasional. Walaupun deklarasi ini ditolak dalam Konferensi Jenewa 1958 tentang Hukum Laut, Indonesia tetap bersikukuh dengan kebijakan ini dengan mengeluarkan UU No. 4 Tahun 1960 yang mempertahankan  sikap  ‘persistent non-compliance’ terhadap international law’, sampai akhirnya gagasan ini diterima dalam Konvensi PBB 1982 tentang Hukum Laut.

Sikap apatis terhadap hukum internasional semakin meningkat manakala politik luar negeri Indonesia mendekat ke blok sosialis Russia dan China di era perang dingin, dan eskalasinya semakin buruk pada tahun 1963 waktu Presiden Soekarno menggagas ide kontroversial tentang ‘new emerging forces’ (NEFOS) yang mewakili negara-negara Asia, Amerika Latin, negara-negara sosialis dan berhadapan dengan apa yang dia sebut sebagai ‘old emerging forces’ (OLDEFOS) yang merujuk pada negara-negara kapitalis. Gerakan ini berakhir ketika Soekarno dipaksa turun dari kekuasaannya pada tahun 1966. Sikap perlawanan terhadap hukum internasional mencapai klimaks pada saat Indonesia melalui suratnya tanggal 20 January 1965 menyatakan mundur ^[22] dari keanggotaan PBB dan semua organnya dengan dasar pertimbangan sbb:

… that in the circumstances which have been created by colonial powers in the United Nations so blatantly against our anti-colonial struggle and indeed against the lofty principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, the Government felt that no alternative had been left for Indonesia but withdrawal from the United Nations.

Sikap permusuhan Indonesia terhadap hukum internasional juga memperoleh dukungan dari para pakar Indonesia. Dalam rangka pembelaan terhadapa posisi Indonesia yang menarik diri sepihak dari Perjanjian Konferensi Meja Bundar 1949 yang dituduh sebagai pelanggaran pacta sunt servanda, Roeslan Abdulgani, berpendapat bahwa tindakan itu bisa dibenarkan berdasarkan prinsip rebus sic stantibus.^[23] Dalam pernyataannya di London Conference on the Suez Canal Crisis 1956, Abdulgani mengklarifikasi posisi Indonesia terhadap perjanjian internasional dengan menyatakan:

Mr. Chairman, I understand fully Sir Anthony Eden’s remarks this morning about respect for the sanctity of international law. However Mr. Chairman, I should add one comment upon this, and that is that most of international treaties which are a reflection of international law do not respect the sanctity of men as equal human beings irrespective of their race, or their creed or locality. Most of the existing laws between Asian and African and the old-established western world are more or less outmoded and should be regarded as a burden of modern life. They should be revised and be made more adaptable to modern international relations and the emancipation of all parts of mankind.^[24]

Presiden Soekarno juga menggunakan dalil yang diungkapkan oleh Roeslan Abdulgani diatas dalam setiap pidato retorikanya yang akhirnya berhasil menarik hati rankyat Indonesia untuk mendukung kebijakan anti terhadap hukum internasional. Soekarno mengkritik para ahli yang terlalu menekankan pada kesakralan perjanjian internasional karena setiap perjanjian harus dapat direvisi jika bertentangan dengan keadilan dan kemanusiaan. Menurut Soekarno, perjanjian internasional yang merestui penjajahan harus segera diakhiri. ^[25]Pakar hukum lain yang mengecap pendidikan di Belanda, Muhammad Yamin, juga mengkritik hukum internasional yang berlaku saat itu sebagai ciptaan Eropa Barat dimana negara-negara Eropa Timur dan Asia tidak terlibat dalam permubataannya.[26]

Sentimen anti hukum internasional ini telah mengkristal menjadi persepsi publik dan mengakibatkan perkembangan hukum internasional pada era ini di Indonesia sangat lambat bahkan mengarah ke apatisme.

2) “Sikap Bersahabat” Era Orde Baru (1966-1998)

Sejak 1966, Indonesia dibawah kekuasaan rejim orde baru yang dipimpin oleh Presiden Soeharto sampai tahun 1998. Rejim ini ditandai dengan dominasi kekuasaan eksekutif yang senantiasa mampu mengambil keputusan politik yang sangat solid. Pengalaman ketatanegaraan sebelumnya telah mendorong rejim ini untuk menekankan stabilitas politikd dan ekonomi sehingga menutup ruang adanya perubahan konstitutional yang bakal rawan terhadap stabilitas dimaksud.

Dibawah rejim ini, sikap terhadap hukum internasional cenderung “bersahabat” karena kiblat politik luar negeri-nya sangat bersahabat dengan dunia Barat. Terjadi pergeseran yang signifikan dari yang semula bermusuhan menjadi lebih berkerjasama dengan dunia internasional. The attitude had moved from being hostile to being more cooperative with respect to international law. Pergeseran ini ditegaskan oleh pakar hukum internasional, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, yang berupaya mencari keseimbangan antara kebutuhan negara-negara berkembang dan stabilitas hukum internasional yang berlaku saat itu.  Dia menyadari bahwa hukum internasional yang berlaku mungkin sudah usang dan tidak lagi sesuai dengan perubahan masyarakat internasional. Namun dalam menyikapi keusangan hukum internasional ini sikap penolakan Indonesia tidak harus diartikan sebagai pelanggaran hukum ini. Selanjutnya dia mengembangkan dalil bahwa Indonesia dapat saja tidak menerapkan norma hukum internasional yang usang itu sepanjang Indonesia juga memperhatikan kepentingan hukum negara-negara lain. Dalam hal ini Indonesia sangat ingin berkontribusi terhadap perubahan hukum internasional yang lebih memenuhi kebutuhan masyarakat internasional yang telah berubah ini.^[27]

Politik luar negari Indonesia selanjutnya terinspirasi dengan gagasan konstruktif dari Mochtar Kusumaatmadja sehingga penolakan terhadap hukum laut internasional yang kerasa di jaman orde lama bergeser menjadi politik keterlibatan yang konstuktif di jaman orde baru. Sejak era ini, Indonesia tidak lagi menolak membabi buta hukum laun namun turut aktif menegosiasikan klaim Deklarasi Djuanda-nya pada rangkaian perundingan hukum laut di PBB yang berakhir dengan diterimanya konspe negara kepulauan pada  Konferensi PBB tentang Hukum Laut 1982.^[28] Suksesnya Indonesia memeperoleh pengakuan atas apa yang selama ini dinilai sebagai  “pelanggaran hukum internasional” telah mengubah pola pikir para ahli bahwa apa yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia adaah “membuat hukum internasional” ketimbang melanggarnya (making istead of breaking international law).^[29]  Mochtar Kusumaatmadja^[30] selalu menekankan bahwa klaim unilateral yang didorong oleh kebutuhan prinsip suatu negara dapat mengkristal menjadi suatu norma hukum baru berdasarkan kebiasaan internasional. Dalam hal ini menurunya, klaim unilateral dari negara berkembang, terlepas apakah itu destruktif atau konstruktif terhadap hukum internasional pada awalnya, tidak harus berarti tetap desruktif pada akhirnya. Dalil ini telah dibuktikan dengan pengalaman Indonesia di bidang hukum laut.

Mengingat bahwa rejim order baru didukung oleh kekuasaan militer yang kuat di wilayah politik, hukum internasional juga dimaknai dan diperlakukan dalam konteks berdasarkan politik ketimbang hukum. Dalam hal ini kehendak politik Presiden sangat menentukan tentang bagaimana hukum internasional beroperasi di wilayah hukum nasional. Sehingga tidaklah mengherankan jika keputusan politik lah yang mendorong Indonesia menerima jurisdiksi Mahkamah Internasional untuk penyelesaian konflik pulau Sipadan dan Ligitan dengan Malaysia pada tahun 1997. Kekuatan politik pula yang mendorong Indonesia mengintegrasikan Timtim kedalam wilayah Indonesia tahun 1976, yang oleh masyarakat internasional dinilai sebagai pelanggaran hukum internasional.^[31] Artinya, hukum internasional tidak berakar pada sistem hukum nasional melainkan ditegakkan dan bahkan dilanggar oleh pertimbangan politik yang kuat.

Issue HAM sangat menonjol di era orde baru. Dalam hal ini Indonesia mengembangkan prinsip hukum internasional tentang penolakan campur tangan asing kedalam masalah dalam negeri dalam rangka serangan internasional di bidang HAM.^[32] Mengingat kekuatan militer di Indonesia berorientasi pada keamanan nasional yang acap kali memasuki wilayah sipil, maka hukum internasional tentang HAM menjadi tidak kompatibel dengan politik pemerintah. Kecaman HAM terhadap Indonesia semakin memuncak pada waktu Indonesia menduduki Timtim pada tahu 1975. Dalam rangka menjawab kecaman internasional ini, Indonesia menggalang kekuatan Asia dan mengembangkan konsep Asian value dengan melahirkan apa yang disebut konsep cultural relativism (melawan Western universality of human rights^)[33] yang oleh dunia akademisi dikecam sebagai upaya untuk melegitimasi kekuasaan otoriter.^[34]

Kebijakan HAM ini pada hakekatnya didasarkan pada konsep tentang negara integral yang telah digagas oleh Professor Soepomo pada watu pendirian negara di awal kemerdekaan, yang pada waktu itu menolak ide individualisme.^[35] Pada tahap  persiapan kemerdekaan RI, ide negara integralistik dinilai lebih berakar pada kultur Indonesia yang menekankan bahwa hak individu dan hak negara tidak dapat dipisahkan. Ide ini secara efektif diterapkan oleh pemerintah order baru sehingga tidak membuka ruang bagi penghormatan HAM individu seperti yang dibayangkan oleh dunia Barat.

3) Hukum International di Era Reformasi (1998-sekarang)

Rerformasi politik yang berlangsung sejak 1999 telah melahirkan perubahan radikal dalam sistem hukum dan kelembagaan ketatanegaraan Indonesia. Dalam perubahan radikal ini, hukum internasional sayangnya belum memperoleh perhatian yang memadai dan bahkan tidak melahirkan sama sekali aturan konstitusi tentang hukum internasional. Luputnya perhatian politik terhadap hukum internasional dapat dimaklumi. Reformasi yang terjadi sejak tahun 1998 dipicu oleh tekanan politik domestik dalam rangka menyelesaikan persoalan dalam negari akibat krisis multi dimensi yang dipicu oleh krisi ekonomi. Sehingga arah reformasi lebih diorientasikan pada pembangunan kelembagaan konstitusional dimana hukum internasional bukan merupakan prioritas. Dalam konteks ini gerakan reformasi tidak melihat ada yang salah dalam hukum internasional dalam sistem hukum Indonesia dan kalau pun ada tidaklah langsung bersentuhan persoalan reformasi itu sendiri. Oleh sebab itu persoalan status hukum internasional tidaklah merupakan agenda penting dalam reformasi.

Faktor utama lainnya yang mengakibatkan hukum internasional tidak menjadi perhatian reformasi adalah karena disiplin hukum ini tidak terlalu popular dalam kesharian masyarakat dan tidak terlalu menarik minat publik Indonesia. Hukum internasional masih difahami sebagai bidang yang ekslusif tugas pemerintah khususnya kementerian luar negeri. Ketertarikan terhadap hukum internasional masih terbatas pada komunitas akademis dan itu pun masih diajarkan secara minimalis dan masih jauh dari standar negara-negara maju^[36] sehingga studi dan penelitian tentang hukum internasional masih sangat langka.^[37] Sekalipun merupakan mata kuliah dalam berbagai universitas, hukum ini masih diajarkan secara terisolasi tanpa perlu mengkaitkannya dengan hukum nasional. Di lain pihak, disiplin hukum tata negara dan administrasi negara telah berkembang dengan pesat di Indonesia namun agak membisu soal hukum internasional. Bab tentang hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional sekalipun diajarkan di mata kuliah hukum internasional jarang merujuk kepada praktik Indonesia dan kalau pun ada hanya bersifat indikasi saja.^[38] Pakar hukum Indonesia secara umum masih belum memiliki minat untuk mendalami tentang status hukum internasional di dalam sistem hukum nasional.

Sampai pada tahun 2000-an, hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional belum menjadi perhatian akademis dan belum menyinggung kepentingan praktis para praktisi sehingga bukanlah merupakan issue yang kontroversial. Hal ini disebabkan oleh faktor-faktor sbb:

1. a)Pakar konstitusi/tatanegara dan pakar hukum internasional di Indonesia masih terpaku dengan wilayah disiplinnya sendiri-sendiri dan memandang hukum internasional menurut perspektif masing-masing.^[39] Bagi pakar konstitusi/tatanegara, perjanjian internasional secara teoritis adalah sumber hukum tatanegara. Sedangkan bagi pakar hukum internasional, perjanjian internasional adalah dokumen hukum yang tunduk pada hukum internasional. Pakar hukum internasional tidak tertarik untuk membahas status hukum ini dalam sistem hukum nasional. Karena perjanjian internasional ditangani oleh eksektuf yang kuat dan dominan maka issue-issue praktis tentang perjanjian internasional tidak pernah muncul dalam wacana dan perdebatan publik.  Jika timbul permasalahan maka keputusan politik akan dengan serta merta menuntaskannya tanpa hiruk pikuk debat publik. Komunitas akademis menjadi tidak terstimulasi untuk memperdebatkannya dan kalaupun didiskusikan maka akan terlihat kurangnya aspek-aspek internasional dari hukum tatanegara, dan sebaliknya lemahnya pembahasan aspek konstitusional dari hukum internasional.
2. b)Sejak kemerdekaan RI tahun 1945, dunia akademisi Indonesia diwarnai oleh sentimen nasionalisme yang tinggi dan memandang hukum internasional sebagai hukum kolonial. Para pakar akan melirik hukum internasional hanya jika mempengaruhi kepentingan hukum nasionalnya.^[40]
3. c)Sebagai negara kepulauan (archipelagic state), Indonesia berada pada wilayah terpencil yang jauh dari interkasi lintas perbatasan. Hubungan internasional hanya dilihat sebagai hubungan antar pemerintah ketimbang hubungan antar manusia. Pola pikir ini mendorong para pakar untuk bersikap konservatif tentang hukum internasional sehingga hanya memandang perjanjian internasional sebagai dokumen antar negara urusan ekslusif kementerian luar negeri. Pertanyaan tentang status domestik dari perjanjian internasional tidak meyangkut kepentingan publik sehingga tidak menjadi perhatian para pakar konstitusi/tatanegara maupun pakar hukum internasional.

C. Perlunya Rejim Hukum yang jelas tentang Perjanjian Internasional dalam transisi demokrasi Indonesia

1) Konsekuensi dari Sistem Hukum yang berlandaskan Demokrasi  

Indonesia sedang menuju ke arah sistem demokrasi penuh. Dalam suatu negara demokrasi, prinsip rule of law/Rechtsstaat, yang bercirikan legalitas, kepastian hukum dan equality adalah bagian yang tidak terpisahkan.  Semua negara demokrasi pada umumnya akan mengalami tuntutan tentang elemen-elemen ini yang pada akhirnya harus memperjelas tentang status perjanjian dalam sistem hukum nasionalnya. Mengingat perjanjian internasional akan menciptakan hak dan kewajiban terhadap individu maka validitasnya dalam hukum nasional harus jelas secara konstitutional dan tidak didasarkan pada suatu diskresi semata. Dengan kata lain, rejim hukum yang jelas yang mengatur status perjanjian dalam hukum nasional adalah conditio sine quo non untuk suatu sistem negara demokrasi. Proses transisi demokrasi di Indonesia mensyaratkan rejim hukum yang jelas tentang hukum internasional.

Sebelum menjadi negara demokrasi, pada umumnya suatu negara tidak memiliki rejim hukum yang jelas tentang status hukum internasional dalam hukum nasionalnya. Afrika Selatan, contohnya, sebagai bekas jajahan negara-negara persemakmuran seyogianya sudah memiliki rejim yang jelas dari negara penjajahnya, namun kenyataannya asumsi ini tidak tercermin dalam jurisprudensinya.[41] Rejim hukum yang jelas tentang status hukum khsusunya perjanjian internasional baru tercipta sejak lahirnya Konstitusi baru tahun 1994 Afrika Selatan.[42] Untuk pertama kalinya, Konstitusi Afrika Selatan menyediakan memuat norma yang mengatur perjanjian dan hukum internasional dalam hukum nasionalnya. Hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional lebih jelas diatur pasca reformasi di Afrika Selatan.[43]

Negara-negara demokrasi baru di Eropa Timur dan bekas Uni Soviet juga mengalami situasi yang sama dan pada umumnya dituntut untuk memperjelas status perjanjian dan hukum internasional dalam hukum nasionalnya. Sebelum proses demokratisasi, status hukum internasional sama sekali tidak diatur dalam konstitusi maupun undang-undang nasionalnya. Akibatnya, sistem hukumnya menjadi tidak konsisten dan tidak tegas dalam teori dan prakteknya. Itulah sebabnya, para pakar di negara-negara ini mendesak agar hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional diatur secara jelas dalam konstitusi.[44] Sekalipun masing-masing negara berbeda dalam mengatur hubungan ini namun klausula tentang ini sudah terdapat di banyak konstitusi negara-negara tersebut.[45]

Indonesia pada akhirnya harus melalui tuntutan seperti yang dialami negara-negara demokrasi dimaksud. Sejak jatuhnya orde baru, terdapat tuntutan yang keras untuk perubahan struktur dan bangunan politik Indonesia.^[46] Struktur politik dan ketatanegaraan ini telah telah mengalami reformasi melalui amandemen UUD 1945 yang berlangsung antara tahun 1999-2002. Reformasi konstitusional telah menghasilkan perubahan fundamental yang ditandai dengan pembagian kekuasaan yang signifikan dalam rangka terbentuknya sistem demokrasi.

UUD 1945 sebelum amandemen telah dikritik oleh para ahli HTN karena memiliki banyak kelemahan.  Pakar konstitusi Moh. Mahfud[47] menyatakan bahwa UUD 1945 sebelum amandemen menciptakan sistem ekesekutif yang lebih kuat, lemahnya checks and balances, banyaknya pendelegasian aturan ke level UU, banyaknya norma konstitusi yang rancu, serta penekanan pada kemauan politik dan integritas para politisi.**** Amandemen UUD 1945 telah menciptakan sistem yang secara teori dalam mengatasi kelemaahan-kelemahan ini melalui pemberian kekuasaan lebih besar kepada Parlemen, terciptaknya sistem checks and balances serta dianutnya prinsip rule of law. Namun sayangnya, persoalan tentang status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum Indonesia masih belum terjamah oleh amandemen. Sebelum amandemen, pertanyaan ini ditangani melalui diskresi pemerintah tanpa proses checks and balances dari kekuasaan parlemen. Sistem yang terbentuk dapat menciptakan stabilitas dalam mengeimplementasikan perjanjian internasional namun secara bersamaan gagal menjelasan tentang statusnya dalam hukum nasional.

UUD 1945 yang telah diamandemen telah mentransformasikan beberapa  ciri-ciri sbb:

(a) dari otoriter ke pemerintahaan demokratis,

(b) dari executive heavy ke equal checks and balances,

(c) dari kekuasaan militer ke supremasi hukum

(d) dari pengingkaran ke penghormatan terhadap HAM,

 (e) dari sentralisasi ke otonomi daerah.

Konstelasi kekuasaan ketatanegaraan dewasa ini tentunya membutuhkan adanya sistem hukum yang jelas termasuk rejim hukum yang mengatur hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional. Struktur ketatanegaraan pasca amandemen telah memperjelas kekuasaan masing-masing lembaga negara, baik eksekutif, legislatif dan judikatif. Kekuasaan eksekutif telah diberi kekuasaan yang terbatas namun masih memegang kekuasaan untuk membuat perjanjian internasional dan implementasinya. Kekuasaan legislatif diberi kekuasaan yang lebih besar dalam pembuatan undang-undang dan tentunya akan mencakup kekuasaan yang dapat mempengaruhi penentuan status norma internasional kedalam hukum nasional. Kekuasaan judikatif saat ini telah bebas dari pengaruh eksekutf dan tentunya berwenang menginterpretasikan dan menentukan kekuatan mengikat perjanjian internasional. Selain itu, bebasnya kekuasaan judikatif juga melahirkan pertanyaan apakah kekuasaan ini mencakup unuk menguji perjanjian internasional terhadap UUD 1945. Dalam sistem checks and balances ini, setiap organ negara harus memiliki posisi konstitusional yang jelas tentang hak dan kewajiban dari perjanjian internasional.

Perdebatan tentang hubungan hukum nasional dan hukum internasional khususnya perjanjian internasional telah menjadi agenda publik. Pertanyaan tentang status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional telah mencuat tidak hanya di kalangan praktisi melainkan juga di kalangan pembuat UU dan penegak hukum. Perjanjian internasional yang dibuat oleh Indonesia semakin meningkat baik dari segi kualitas maupun kuantitias. Perjanjian yang dibuat deawas ini cenderung mulai mengatur hak dan kepentingan individual seperti HAM, lingkungan hidup dan perdagangan sehingga melahirkan pertanyaan tentang bagaimana penerapaknya dalam hukum nasional.[48] Dengan perkembangan ini maka ketiadaan rejim hukum yang jelas akan melahirkan ketidakpastian hukum tentang hak dan kewajiban individual yang lahir dari perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut. Dari perspektif internasional, Indonesia tentunya dituntut untuk memenuhi kewajiban internasionalnya yang lahir dari setiap perjanjian internasional yang mengikatnya. Para pakar meyakini bahwa negara yang tidak memiliki rejim hukum yang jelas tentang hukum internasional akan mengalami risiko ganda, yaitu melanggar hukum internasional dan merusak balance of powers dalam sistem konstitusinya.[49]

Ketidakpastian akibat tidak adanya rejim hukum yang jelas tentang hukum internasional semakin diperparah dengan derasnya arus globalisasi. Karakter perjanjian internasional di era globalisasi ini sangat intrusif dan menyentuh wilayah ekslusif hukum nasional, seperti perjanjian-perjanjian di bidang HAM, lingkungan hidup dan perdagangan.^[50] Hukum Indonesia tidak dapat lagi berdiri sendiri. Pengalaman negara-negara lain menunjukkan bahwa setiap sistem hukum nasional saat ini harus melakukan rekonsiliasi terhadap standar internasional. Jika di masa-masa lalu hukum nasional bisa kebal dari pengaruh internasional maka dewasa ini telah mengkristal adanya syarat minimum bagi setiap negara untuk mematuhi suatu perjanjian internasional.^[51]

Sebagai negara demokrasi yang terinspirasi dengan model Barat, Indonesia saat ini berupaya untuk menerapkan standar negara-negara modern. Sistem negara hukum, partisipasi parlemen, pembagian kekuasaan, kepastian hukum merupakan ciri-ciri negara demokrasi yang hendak dibangun oleh negara Indonesia. Konsekuensi logis dari upaya ini adalah bahwa Indonesia perlu memiliki rejim hukum yang jelas yang mampu menjawab secara pasti dan predictable tentang status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional. Pertanyaan tentang status perjanjian ini juga akan terkait dengan kedudukan hirarkis-nya dalam sturktur perundang-undangan. Sejak kemerdekaannya, Indonesia telah menganut teori Stufenbau dari Hans Kelsen. Dengan teori ini maka Indonesia telah membangun secara hirarkis sumber hukum dan tata urutan perundang-undangannya yang dimulai dari norma fundamental Pancasila, UUD 1945, UU dan seterusnya.^[52] Sistem hirarkis ini juga akan menyisakan pertanyaan tentang bagaimana kedudukan hukum internasional khsusunya perjanjian internasional dalam bangunan hirarkis tersebut.^[53]

2) Pentaatan terhadap Hukum Internasional

Indonesia menghadapi tekanan dinamis dari dua arah sekaligus secara bersamaan Pertama, tekanan dari dinamika reformasi yang menuntut adanya standar demokrasi serta penegakan dan pentaatan hukum termasuk kewajiban internasional Indonesia yang lahir dari hukum termasuk perjanjian internasional.  Kedua, tekanan dari globalisasi yang juga membentuk suatu sistem dalam masyarakat internasional yang telah menuntut adanya standar minimum tentang postur suatu sistem hukum nasional dalam mengimplementasikan kewajiban internasionalnya.[54]

Sejak kemerdekaan, Indonesia telah membuat banyak perjanjian internasional dan telah merupakan aktivitas rutin dari pemerintah. Indonesia turut aktif membuat perjanjian internasional dalam berbagai forum baik multilateral, regional maupun bilateral. Sampai saat ini, Indonesia telah mendpositkan sekitar 4000 dokumen “perjanjian” yang mengatur berbagai issue. Jumlah perjanjian yang membutuhkan pemberlakuan dalam hukum nasional juga semakin meningkat khususnya di bidang ekonomi seperti pasar bebas, investasi, penghindaran pajak berganda; kerjasama hukum seperti ekstradisi, bantuan hukum timbal balik, pembrantasan kriminal terorganisasi, anti korupsi, dan pemberantasan terorisme.

Sejak reformasi tahun 1998, semua Presiden yang memerintah sampai saat ini secara konsisten menetapkan politik luar negeri yang berorientasi pada peningkatkan peran Indonesia di fora internasional, menciptakan perdamaian, pemulihan citra Indonesia di mata dunia, dan mendorong terciptanya tata ekonomi dunia yang lebih baik pada tingka regional maupun internasional serta mendukung pembangunan nasional.[55] Untuk memperoleh reputasi dan kredibilitas dimata internasional seperti yang dicanangkan dalam politik luar negeri itu Indonesia harus memperlihatkan kepatuhannya kepada hukum internasional.[56] Pentaatan terhadap perjanjian internasional merupakan parameter utama. Sebagai pihak dalam perjanjian internasional Indonesia terikat pada prinsip pacta sunt servanda, suatu prinsip fundamental dalam hukum perjanjian internasional bahwa para pihak harus melaksanakan perjanjian dengan itikad baik.[57] Kegagalan untuk melaksanakan perjanjian akan melahirkan pelanggaran hukum internasional dan hanya akan merusak reputasi dan kredibilitas Indonesia di mata dunia.

Kegagalan mentaati perjanjian internasional akan melahirkan pertanggungjawaban internasional dan negara tidak dapat berlindung dibalik hukum nasoinalnya untuk menjustifikasi kegagalan ini. Dalam hal ini, suatu negara justru harus memastikan bahwa pentaatan perjanjian ini mendapat justifikasi dari hukum nasionalnya. Di lain pihak, bagaimana perjanjian internasional ditransformasikan,  di adopsi, dan diperingkatkan dalam hukum nasonal adalah urusan hukum nasional.^[58] Kedaulatan hukum nasonal untuk menentukan status ini akan tetap dihormati sepanjang hukum internasional masih berkarakter Westphalian.^[59] Mengingat bahwa hukum nasional harus menentukan status ini maka setiap hukum nasional harus memiliki rejim hukum yang jelas tentang hukum internasional khususnya perjanjian internasional.

Globalisasi saat ini cenderung mensyaratkan adanya kepastian bahwa setiap hukum nasional negara pihak mentaati perjanjian internasional sehingga dan untuk itu hukum internasional telah mulai mengembangkan suatu mekanisme pentaatan perjanjian. Indonesia telah menjadi pihak pada berbagai perjanjian internasional yang menyediakan mekanisme pentaatan dimaksud seperti Konvensi-konvensi HAM yang diperlengkapi dengan mekanisme monitoring.[60] Indonesia telah dimonitor secara regular oleh mekanisme ini dan dari perspektif politik luar negeri tetap berkomitment untuk mentaati kewajiban perjanjiannya.[61] Mengingat konvensi-konvensi HAM mengatur hak indvidu yang merupakan domain hukum nasional, maka implementasi dari hak-hak ini di dalam hukum nasional menjadi mutlak. Untuk maksud itu, Indonesia sudah menghadapi berbagai persoalan hukum tentang bagaimana perjanjian ini beroperasi di dalam hukum nasional.[62]

Dalam kontek regional, Indonesia saat ini terlibat dalam proses konstitusionalisasi di ASEAN. Diberlakukannya Piagam ASEAN 2008 telah melahirkan pertanyaan baru tentang hubungan Piagam ASEAN termasuk aturan turunannya dengan hukum nasional setiap negara. Para pakar telah membayangkan munculnya perosalan-persoalan hukum dari meningkatnya konstitusionalisasi hukum internasional yang disebabkan beroperasinya Piagam ASEAN termasuk persoalan bagaimana mengintegrasikan norma-norma yang lahir dari sistem ASEAN kedalam hukum nasional,  menginterpretasikannya serta menerapkannya dalam domain hukum nasional.[63]

3) Desentralisasi

Salah satu agenda utama dari reformasi 1998 adalah tuntutan desentralisasi kekuasaan yang selama ini terkonsentrasi pada pemerintah pusat. Sebelumnya, pemerintah pusat memegang kendali pemerintahaan atas pemerintah daerah. Kekuasaan pemerintah daerah bersumber dari pemerintah pusat sehingga dalam pelaksanaan fungsinya pemerintah daerah bertindak atas nama pemerintah pusat.

UUD 45 hasil reformasi telah memberi ruang bagi otonomi daerah yang memberikan kekuasaan yang lebih besar kepada daerah melalui sistem tiga lapis: pemerintah pusat, provinsi, dan kabupaten/kota. Masing-masing tingkat diberikan otonomi untuk melaksanakan fungsi pemerinthaan untuk hampir di semua bidang kecuali politi luar negeri, pertahana, keamanan, keuangan, kehakiman dan agama.

Secara pararel terdapat pula otonomi khusus yang diberikan kepada dua provinsi yaitu Provinsi Aceh dan Papua. Otonomi khusus ini diberikan karena secara historis terdapat karakteristik khusus dari kedua daerah ini yang berbeda dengan daerah-daerah lain. Tuntutan akan otonomi khusus ini sudah ada sebelum reformasi berlangsung dan selama ini telah menjadi issue politik yang sensitif antara pusat dan daerah. Konflik antara pusat dan daerah ini telah mengundang perhatian internasional dan berpontensi untuk gerakan separatisme yang melibatkan negara-negara lain. Dengan otonomi khusus ini maka kedua daerah tersebut memperoleh kekuasaan yang lebih besar dibandingkan provinsi-provinsi lainnya.

Adanya otonomi daerah ini akan melahirkan pertanyaan baru tentang kekuasaan membuat perjanjian internasional pemerintah daerah khususnya jika materi yang diperjanjikan berada dibawa kewenang eksklusifnya. Terlebih lagi dengan otonomi khusus yang diberikan kepada Pemerintah Papua dan Aceh telah melahirkan tuntutan baru agar mereka dapat langsung berinteraksi dengan masyarakat internasional atas namanya sendiri yang pada akhirnya menimbulkan pertanyaan apakah mereka berwenang untuk membuat perjanjian dengan pihak asing. Pertanyaan ini bukan hal yang baru bagi setiap negara modern dan selalu muncul di banyak negara khususnya yang berkarakter federalisme.

Para pakar hukum sepakat bahwa konstitusi masing-masing negara sangat menentukan dalam pemberian kekuasaan membuat perjanjian oleh entitas daerah. Kekuasaan ini dapat dinikmati oleh pemerintah daerah jika diberikan oleh konstitusinya.^[64] Draft akhir dari Komisi Hukum Internasional tentang Perjanjian Internasional^[65] yang kemudian dihapus pada saat Konferensi pada tahun 1969 menyerahan persoalan ini kepada konstitusi masing-masing negara. Draft tersebut menyatakan: States members of a federal union may posses a capacity to conclude treaties if such capacity is admitted by the federal constitution and within the limits there laid down. Dihapuskan draft pasal ini tidak diartikan sebagai penolakan terhadap kekuasaan negara bagian untuk membuat perjanjian internasional.[66]

Menurut pandangan tradisionl, kekuasaan membuat perjanjian internasional secara keseluruhan berada di tangan Raja sebagai atribut kedaulatan. Namun gerakan konstitusionalisme dan pemisahan kekuasaan dewasa ini telah mendorong lahirnya aturan konstitusi yang membedakan antara membuat perjanjian internasional dengan melaksanakan perjanjian internasional.[67] Sebagai konsekuensi, kekuasaan membuat perjanjian telah telah dialokasikan kepada berbagai organ negara baik secara horizontal maupun vertikal. Secara horizontal terdapat tuntutan untuk adanya partisipasi parlemen sehingga terjadi pembagian kekuasaan antara pemerintah dan parlemen dan memberikan kepada parlemen kekuasaan untuk melaksanakan perjanjian dalam kerangka fungsi legislasi. Secara vertikal telah lahir pemerintah daerah yang memiliki kewenangan eksklusif atas beberapa urusan pemerintahaan yang mengakibatkan mereka harus berpartisipasi jika urusan eksklusif ini diperjanjikan dengan pihak asing.

Persoalan ini sangat nyata dalam sistem federalisme karena kekuasaan pemerintah terbagi antara pemerintah pusat dan daerah dan setiap penduduk akan tunduk pada dua otoritas pembuat undang-undang secara bersamaan. Dalam hal ini masing-masing otoritas tidak tunduk satu sama lain (subordinasi) melainkan bersifat koordinatif.[68] Praktek negara menunjukkan bahwa ternyata persoalan kontroversi tentang kekuasaan membuat perjanjian internasional oleh entitas atau bagian negara tidak hanya melulu terjadi pada situasi negara federalisme melainkan juga dalam situasi hubungan kolonial. overseas territories, dan dependent territories. Ini membuktikan bahwa persoalan kekuasaan membuat perjanjian bisa muncul di setiap entitas selain negara.

Walapun terdapat kecenderungan negara-negara untuk menghapuskan kekuasaan membuat perjanjian dari entitas daerah,[69] persoalan dasarnya masih mewarnai hubungan pusat dan daerah. Tantangan yang muncul saat ini adalah bagaimana menangani konflik antara pusat dan daerah jika pemerintah pusat membuat perjanjian yang materinya dibawah kekuasaan eksklusif dari pemerintah daerah. Saat ini muncul gagasan bahwa keterlibatan pemerintah daerah untuk membuat perjanjian tidaklah semata-mata untuk maksud melindungi kepentingan daerah tsb melainkan adalah konsekuensi dari desentralisasi dan globalisasi. Di era globalisasi terdapat kebutuhan adanya kebijakan luar negeri oleh otonomi daerah sebagai konsekuensi dari demokratisasi, federalisme, tingkat pertumbuhan ekonomi, meningkatnya internasionalisasi pasar.[70]

Terlepas dari apa pun struktur negara, apakah kesatuan atau federalisme, pertanyaan tentang bagaimana kewenangan eksklusif daerah diperlakukan jika urusan yang dibawah wewenang eksklusif ini menjadi objek dan materi dari suatu perjanjian internasional. Pertanyaan ini akan bersentuhan dengan kekuasaan membuat perjanjian internasional menurut hukum konstitusinya. Beberpa perjanjian justru telah membuka ruang bagi partisipasi sub-negara jika materinya adalah wewenang eksklusif dari sub-negara itu yang berada diluar kewenangan pemerintah pusat.[71] Dalam hal ini fenomena desentralisasi tetap melahirkan persoalan kontroversi terhadap posisi negara terhadap perjanjian internasional.

***

 

[1] Lambertus Erades, ‘International Law and the Netherlands Legal Order’, in H.F. van Panhuys (ed.), International Law in the Netherlands, vol. III (1980), 376.

[2] Andrea Bianchi, ‘International Law and US Courts: the Myth of Lohengrin Revisited’, 15 EJIL (2004) 4, 751; Contrary to the experiences of the Western countries, Ko argued that most Asian countries have hardly discussed this question, see Swan Sik Ko, ‘International Law in Municipal Legal Orders of Asian States: Virgin Land’, in Ronald St. J. Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1994), 740.

[3] Comparative studies with reference to some developing countries’ legal system on treaty making process and the domestic status of treaties can be found in Duncan B Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee and L. Benyamin Ederington (eds), National Treaty Law and Practice (2005); David Sloss (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, A Comparative Study (2009); Dinah Shelton (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation and Persuasion (2011).

[4] Tiyanjana Maluwa, ‘The Incorporation of International Law and its Interpretational Role in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey’, 23 SAYIL (1998), 48.

[5] Former British colonies in developing world such as in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.) and in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam) would inevitably apply the same principles of the British common law system on the status of treaties. However Shaw suggested that while it would be the case in common law states, the civil law states manifest certain differences, see Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (1997), 123.

[6] Swan Sik Ko categorizes these newly independent states as virgin land, see Sik Ko (note 4), 737-752.

[7] The only available English source describing the Indonesian law of treaty so far is found in Swan Sik Ko, The Indonesian Law and Treaties 1945-1990 (1993).

[8] Sik Ko (note 4), 738.

[9] During the colonial period, Indonesia had no legal system governing treaties since it was a part of the Netherlands and had no sovereign status. Post independent period, Indonesia inherits most Dutch legal system (civil law and criminal law) except constitutional law.

[10] The term ‘old order’ (1945-1966) was used and introduced by the ‘new order’ regime (1966-1999).

[11] James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations (1963), 43-44; J.J.G. Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International Law (1961), 221.

[12] The Independence of Indonesia took place before the emerging of the rules of self-determination which was developed by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and Declaration of Granting Independence to Colonial People and Countries, 1960. At the later stage, following the decolonization process after the World War II, the view of developing countries towards international law was becoming a classical topic in international law standard books, see N. Shaw (note 7), 36-39; Michael Akehurst, Modern Introduction to International Law (1977), 29; Antonio Cassese, International Law (2005), 115-123. Some scholars advances discussion under the topic “Third World Approaches to International Law”, see B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: Manifesto’, 8 International Community Law Review (2006), 3-27; David P. Fidler, ‘Revolt Against of From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law’, 2 Chinese JIL (2003) 29, 1-46; Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’, 2 Chinese JIL (2003) 1, 77-103.

[13] The perception towards international law as buttressed colonialism was shared by the most Asian people in 20^th century, see Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘Asian Perspective to International Law in the Age of Globalization’, 5 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2001) 2, 284-313.

[14] Sunaryati Hartono, ‘The Interaction between National Law and International Law in Indonesia’, in Paul Waart, Paul Peters and Erik Denters (eds), International Law and Development (1988), 35.

[15] B.H. Vlekke, Indonesia in 1956 (1957), 9.

[16] Decision of Landesgericht 1958 and Oberlandesgericht Bremen 1959, De Vereingde Deli Maatschapijen vs Deutsch-Indonesischen Tabak Handels G.m.b.H; Martin Domke, ‘Indonesian Nationalisation Measures before Foreign Courts’, 54 AJIL (1960) 2, 205-323 and the reply by Hans W. Baade, ‘Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts- a Reply’, 54 AJIL (1960), 801-835.

[17] Board of Editors, ‘The Measure Taken by Indonesian Government against the Netherlands Enterprises’, 5 NILR (1958) 3, 227-247; Lord McNair, ‘The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia’, 6 NILR (1959) 3, 218-256; Alfred Verdross, ‘Die Nationalisierung niederländischer Unternehmungen in Indonesien im Lichte des Völkerrechts’, 6 NILR (1959) 3, 278-290.

[18] Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Pengantar Hukum Internasional (Introduction to International Law) (1976), 48-49.

[19] Some writers like Sornarajah states that: ‘once free, the new States began to construct a series of principles of international law that conserved their interest’, see Sornarajah (note 15), 286.

[20] Daniel P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea (1982), 39.

[21] Arthur H. Dean, ‘The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas’, 54 AJIL (1960) 4, 753.

[22] The UN Charter provides no provision on withdrawal so it is argued that the Indonesian action had no basis, see Egon Schwelb, ‘Withdrawal from the United Nations: the Indonesian Intermezzo’, 61 AJIL (1967), 661-672. In 1966 Indonesian membership was resumed and the Secretary General U Thant regarded the “withdrawal” as a suspension of Indonesian activities in the UN. Consequently, Indonesia remained bearing its annual contribution in the absence of its activities, see Kusumaatmajda (note 20), 89-99.

[23] Roesland Abdulgani, Hukum dalam Revolusi dan Revolusi dalam Hukum (Law in the Revolution and Revolution in the Law) (1965), 36.

[24] Speech of the Indonesian Foreign Minister at the London Conference on Suez Canal, Aug. 16, 1956, in Abdulgani (note 25), 59.

[25] President Soekarno’s Speech on Aug. 17, 1959, Bahan-bahan Pokok Indoktrinasi (Basic Materials on Indoctrination (1964), 33.

[26] Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Preparatory Documents to the Constitution of 1945), vol. III (1960), 48.

[27] Kusumaatmadja (note 20), 63.

[28] The Archipelagic concept for which Indonesia sought international recognition had been submitted to the UN Conference by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in a well descriptive international legal policy, see Kusumaatmadja, Konsepsi Hukum Negara Nusantara pada Konferensi Hukum Laut ke III  (The Legal Concept of Archipelagic State at Conference of Law of the Sea)(1977).

[29] Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The Archipelagic Regime in the Philippines and Indonesia, Making or Breaking International Law’, 6 International Journal of Estuarine (1991) 1, 13-30.

[30] Kusumaatmadja (note 20), 56-65.

[31] In 1975 Indonesia ‘annexed’ East Timor by invoking that self-determination had taken place as expressed by the representatives of the people through Balibo Declaration of 1975. The UN had not recognised Indonesian claim that the people had exercised the right of self-determination and kept the issue in the agenda until 1999 when in 1999, following the United Nations-sponsored act of self-determination, East Timor became a new sovereign state.

[32] Anja Jetschke, ‘Linking the Unlinkable? International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines’, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (1999), 141; It is held that the socialisation of states to international human rights norms can be divided into a five phase spiral model: 1. Repression; 2. Denial; 3. Tactical concessions; 4. Prescriptive status; 5. Rule-consistent behaviour.

[33] R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (2001), 39-48.

[34] Knut D. Asplund, ‘Resistance to Human Rights in Indonesia’, 10 Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and Law (2009) 1, 27-47.

[35] Prof. Soepomo, a member of Investigating Committee for Independence, submitted before the Committee the idea of ‘totalitarian state’ similar to Germany under Nazi or Japan before WW II to be adopted for independent Indonesia, see Supomo, ‘Integralist State’ in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1966 (1970), 188-192.

[36] Hikmahanto Juwana, ‘Teaching International Law in Indonesia’, 5 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. (2001) 412, 412-415.

^[37] Some scholars have dealt with the question of treaties from the perspective of Indonesian legal policy but mainly emphasising on the conclusion instead of the status of treaties under Indonesian law, such as Harjono, Politik Hukum Perjanjian Internasional (Politics of Law of Treaties) (1999); Swan Sik Ko also introduces briefly about Indonesian Law dealing with treaties, see Swan Sik Ko, The Indonesian Law and Treaties 1945-1990 (1994).

[38] Indonesian scholar in 1950s such as Prof. Utrecht and Prof. Kusumaatmadja in 1980s have indicated that Indonesia tends to pursue monist approach, see E. Utrecht and Moh. Saleh Djindang, Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia (Introduction to Indonesian Law) (1983), 120; Kusumaatmadja (note 20), 65-67.

^[39] The situation is also attributed to the structure of Faculties of Law in Indonesia where constitutional/administrative law and international law are separated subjects belong to separated departments.

^[40] The law of the sea became an interesting subject in 1960-1982 when Indonesia submitted to the UN its national strategic interest to international archipelagic concepts.

[41] J.W. Bridge, ‘The Relationship between International Law and the Law of South Africa’, 20 ICLQ (1971), 746.

[42] Dermott Devine, ‘The Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law in the Light of the Interim South African Constitution 1992’, 44 ICLQ (1995), 1.

[43] Andre Stemmet, ‘The Influence of Recent Constitutional Developments in South Africa on the Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law’, 33 Int’l L.(1999) 1, 74.

[44] Eric Stein, ‘International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions’, 88 AJIL (1994) 3, 427-450.

[45] Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, ‘New Constitution and the Old Problem of the Relationship between International Law and National Law’, 7 EJIL (1996), 34.

[46] I Ketut Putra Erawan, ‘Political Reform and Regional Politics in Indonesia’, 39 Asian Survey  (1999) 4, 588.

[47] Moh. Mahfud, Amandemen Konstitusi Menuju Reformasi Tata Negara (Amending Constitution for Constitutional Reform) (1999), 52; Saldi Isra, Pergeseran Fungsi Legislasi: Menguatnya Model Legislasi Parlementer dalam Sistem Presidensial Indonesia (A Shift in Legislative Function: Enhanced Parliamentary System of Legislation in the Indonesian Presidential System)(2010), 1-10.

[48] The contentious debate is revealed in a series of Focussed Group Discussions on the Status of Treaties under Indonesian Legal System convened by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attended by law scholars from various universities since 2006, the proceedings can be read in Perjanjian Internasional dalam Teori dan Praktik Indonesia, Kompilasi Permasalahan (International Treaty in Theory and Practice in Indonesia, Compilation of Issues), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2008); Status Perjanjian Internasional dalam Tata Perundang-undangan Nasional (Treaties under National Laws), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2009).

[49] Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo, ‘Treaty and National Law in a Globalizing Sytem’, in The Global Community, 1 Yearbook of Internatioanl Law and Jurisprudence (2003) , 140.

[50] It is commonly argued with the globalisation international law has penetrated the once exclusive zone of domestic affair to regulate relationship between governments and their own citizens, see Anne Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, ‘The Future of International is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law)’, 47 Harv. Int’l L. J. (2006) 2, 327.

[51] Stefan Kadelbach, ‘The Transformation of Treaties into Domestic Law’, 42 GYIL (1999), 67.

[52] Since 1966, inspired by Hans Kelsen with his Grundnorm and Stufenbau des Rechts/Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung theory and Hans Nawiasky with his Staatsfundamental Norm theory, Indonesia has constructed a hierarchical system of norms. The current system is governed by the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 12 of 2011 which prescribes that types and hierarchies of regulations are:

1. Constitution 1945;
2.  Decisions of the People’s Consultative Assembly;
3. Laws/Government Regulations in lieu of Laws;
4. Government Regulations;
5. Presidential Regulations;
6.  Provincial Regulations;
7. f.Local and City Regulations.

[53] The rank of treaties has commonly been acknowledged as a critical subject of the status of treaties under domestic law, see Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Introduction’, in G. Jacobs and Roberts (note 3), xxiv.

[54] Kadelbach (note 53), 67-68.

[55] Kementrian Negara Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional, Rencana Pembangungan Jangka Menengah 2004 – 2009, Bab 8 (The Ministry of National Development Planning, the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2004 – 2009 of Indonesia, Chapter 8).

[56] From empirical implications of pre-commitment and diffusion theories, Ginsburg finds that adopting international law is a useful strategy for democracies to lock in particular policies, encouraging trust in governments and state regimes, and bolster global reputation, see Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh and Zachary Elkins, ‘Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law’, University of Illinois Law Review (2008), http://works.bepress.com/tom_ginsburg/18,  201 (last visited on 9 April 2013).

[57] Article 26 VCLT of 1969.

[58] Kadelbach (note 53), 66.

[59] Stephane Beaulac, ‘Westphalia, Dualism and Contextual Interpretation’, EUI Working Papers, European University Institute (2007), 5-6; Mattias Kumm, ‘Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement’, in S. Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2006), 258.

[60] Michael O’Flaherty and Claire O’Brien, ‘Reform of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies: A Critique of the Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body’, 7 Human Rights Law Review (2007) 1, 141-172.

[61] Since its inception as a democratic state in 1998, Indonesia has launched a series of plan of actions on human rights aimed at, inter alia, implementation of the norms and standards of human rights. The current plan of action (2011-2014) is stipulated in the Indonesian Presidential Regulation No. 23 of 2011.

[62] The UN Human Rights Bodies such as Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination put question to Indonesia on the status of the Convention in domestic law and to what extent domestic courts may directly implement its provisions, UN Doc. CERD/C/IDN/3, Seventy-first session, Geneva, 30 July-18 August 2007, question no. 3.

[63] Diane Desierto, ‘ASEAN’S Constitutionalization of International Law: Challenges to Evolution under the New ASEAN Charter’, 49 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. (2010-2011), 268-320.

[64] Helmut Steinberger, ‘Constitutional Subdivisions of States or Unions and their Capacity to conclude Treaties’, 27 ZaöRV (1967), 428; Thomas A. Levy, ‘Provincial International Status Revisited’, 3 Dalhousie L.J. (1976-1977), 75.

[65] ILC Official Records: 21^st session, Supplement No. 9 (A/6309/Rev.1), UN (1966), 10.

[66] Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009), 127-128; The principle reason for deletion was that by making capacity dependent solely upon the provisions of the federal constitution, the paragraph would in practice amount to an invitation to other states to interpret the constitution themselves, see J.S. Stanford, ‘United Nations Law of Treaties Conference: First Session’, 19 U. Toronto L.J. (1969), 60-61.

[67] Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Provisions of Internal Law Regarding Competence to Conclude a Treaty’, 8 Va. J. Int’l L. (1967-1968), 94.

[68] A. Kim Campbell, ‘Federalism and International Relations: The Canadian Experience’, 85 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1991), 125.

[69] Oliver J. Lissitzyn, ‘Territorial Entities other than Independent States in the Law of Treaties’, RdC (1968-III), 87.

[70] Ferran Requejo, ‘Foreign Policy of Constituents Units in a Globalised World’, in Ferran Requejo (ed.), Foreign Policy of Constituents Units at the Beginning of 21st Century (2010), 11.

[71] Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides in Article XII that Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.

(Executive Summary of Dissertation, Goethe University of Frankfurt, 2014)

Dr. iur. Damos Dumoli Agusman[1]

[email protected]

http://perjanjian-internasional.blogspot.com

1. Constitutional Ambiguities concerning Treaties under Indonesian Law

At present, the legal status of treaties under Indonesian law is still ambiguous in nature. By using traditional monist-dualist theories as tools of analysis and the empirical basis of comparative research, it was revealed that the existing constitutional order of Indonesia has not adequately addressed the legal status of treaties under its domestic law. In practice, there are various constitutional interpretations on their domestic status in Indonesia that are at variance with one another, and mutually negate each another. Different interpretations have led to different outcomes. Such various different interpretations stem from various constitutional ambiguities that exist in the constitutional order of Indonesia. The ambiguities are created by the following: unclear constitutional provisions, poorly drafted statutory laws concerning treaties, no theoretically informed basis, and inconsistent constitutional practices. The constitutional ambiguities have resulted in legal uncertainty about the precise effect of treaties under Indonesian law.

The remnants of the monist legal approach of the Netherlands had occupied the legal thoughts of many Indonesian scholars in the earlier period of independence. Many scholars viewed that once a treaty enters into force, it binds Indonesia. Thus the question of deciding on its domestic status was considered unnecessary. The influence of Indonesian constitutional experts in the years to come, coupled with the emerging issues of non-self-executing treaties in international practice, apparently affected such monist legal thoughts, which in turn brought up a dualist legal view in scholarly fields.

In subsequent practice, the two conflicting theories have inadvertently influenced the observations of many scholars in Indonesia within their respective spheres. The debate was however conducted without any theoretically informed concept or academic guidance due to a shortage of legal expertise and a lack of international legal references. The domestic order was influenced by the absence of a theoretical backup. Thus the legal construction existed without any necessary concept relevant to the determination of the domestic status of treaties, such as the mode for granting domestic validity, the hierarchical rank of treaties in domestic law; etc.

The strict separation of the academic disciplines between constitutional law and international law in Indonesia also contributed to the deficiency of the domestic order. The two academic disciplines never collaborated and did not keep each other well-informed. The constitutional order is understood partially, be it from the viewpoint of constitutional law or/and international law that was never approached through a collaborative perspective. Constitutionalists and international law experts in Indonesia interpreted the order in an uncoordinated manner and imposed their own terms in interpreting the constitutional provisions for their own respective academic fields. Both groups of experts understood treaties in their isolated schools of thought and independent perspectives. As a result, the constitutional approach became incoherent because it ignored relevant international aspects of domestic law. The understanding of treaties by international law experts lacked domestic legal aspects. Such rudimentary and incomprehensive outlooks apparently caused and exacerbated the said constitutional ambiguities.

Although the sentiment of nationalism, the culture of resistance or indifference towards the so-called ‘colonial’ international law in Indonesia since the 1960s has been fading away, there was still no great interest among Indonesian scholars to place treaties properly in domestic law until recently. Policy option is still absent in the constitutional agenda. No intensive scholarly debate has to date significantly taken place on the matter. Various factors account for this. From the experiences of the states under comparative examination, this kind of attitude appears to be typical in developing countries that have no close connection to the Western legal tradition, as evidently shown by China. The following historical facts have contributed to the typical unenthusiastic attitude: Indonesia developed its own legal system by disconnecting it from the legal tradition of its former colonial states, its geo-political isolation from intensive international interactions, and the hostile attitude of Indonesia towards international law in the earliest phase of independence. The authoritarian government regime in the aftermath delayed the development of the constitutional order on treaties. The need for a clear regime of the domestic aspect of treaties arose only after Indonesia entered into a democratic system in 1999, 54 years after gaining independence.

As Indonesia continues its transition toward a fully democratic system, the question concerning the legal status of treaties to which Indonesia is bound shall be adequately addressed and their validity under domestic law shall be constitutionally determined. Their domestic treatment can no longer rely on discretionary power. To serve this purpose, Indonesia needs a clear basis for their domestic application as well as their constitutional legitimacy. Such a clear basis could be achieved by optimizing the existing legal regime.

There are at least three constitutional ambiguities that need to be resolved with a view to optimize the existing legal regime concerning the status of treaties under Indonesian law:

1. The utmost ambiguity is rooted in the existing constitutional provisions i.e. Article 11 of the Constitution of 1945: The President, with the approval of the DPR^[2], declares war, makes peace, and treaties with other states, which is considered too simplistic and largely influenced by the provision from the Meiji Constitution. While in Meiji Constitution prescribed that “the Japanese Emperor was empowered to make treaties”), the Indonesian version was only slightly modified through the insertion of the words ‘with the approval of the House of Representatives’. Such a formulation has raised many legal difficulties in practice as it may be interpreted that Parliament could be involved in all stages of the treaty-making process and that all treaties are subject to parliamentary approval.
2. The second problem concerns the role of Parliament in treaty-making, in view of existing constitutional practices which arises from the first ambiguity. The practice distinguishes its functions in a strict manner i.e. whether it is within the ambit of legislative function or otherwise its oversight functions. This has created confusion and brought up a number of versions in the understanding of the outcome of parliamentary participation in treaty-making. According to the Law No. 24 of 2000 on Treaties, the parliamentary approval takes a form of ‘law/Act of Parliament approving treaties’. The choice unintentionally tends to create the said prescription that the determination of the domestic status of treaties would correspond to the legal effect of parliamentary participation. This is in particular when it comes to how one signifies the law approving treaties as the outcome of such participation. On the one hand, the view that parliamentary participation in treaty-making is within the ambit of legislative function has tended to induce the interpretation of the law approving a treaty as a legislative product. On the other, there also appears a view that such participation is within the ambit of the Parliament’s oversight function, which tends to create a strong assertion that the law approving a treaty is merely a formal expression of parliamentary approval.
3. The third relates to the consequence that indirectly took place due to the second ambiguity, which relates to the mode of granting the treaty domestic validity. The choice has created a double interpretation with regard to the law approving a treaty. On the one hand, the view that the law approving treaties is a legislative product has induced the idea that it constitutes a transformation into domestic law. The other view states that the law is merely a formal expression of parliamentary approval and has led to an approach whereby the treaty, upon its entry into force, is considered as adopted instead of transformed into domestic law. The entry into force of the treaty in international law is considered identical with its entry into domestic law.

2. Policy Options

Since neither monism nor dualism is satisfactory, and no single constitutional order subscribes to strict monism or dualism as well as to a stringent mode of adoption or transformation, the idea of establishing a constitutional order on the basis of pure monism and strict dualism is not realistic and therefore should not per se serve as policy option. However, the knowledge of the conceptual divide between the two theories is considered as owing great importance towards a proper understanding concerning the different attitudes of states in giving domestic effect to treaties, and provides a clear perspective necessary for a starting point in the formation of policy in the constitutions.

Various approaches in the actual practice of states illustrate that, under both monism and dualism, the distinction between the validity of treaties under international law and under domestic law becomes inevitable. It is increasingly held in the actual practice that international law and domestic law have their own standpoint in dealing with the relationship between treaties and domestic law by which different outcomes may arise. At this stage international law remains silent on how domestic law should meet treaty obligations. This is because the nature of such obligations is normally that of obligations of result, with the exception of human rights treaties, which have been arguably seen as imposing obligations of conduct. It is therefore not feasible to maintain a policy which holds that the domestic validity of a treaty is dictated by international law, as monism suggests, or to view that a treaty under international law is completely separated from that of a treaty under (which is transformed into) domestic law, as dualism suggests. Actual practice of states demonstrates that both are distinguishable but inextricable. Policy consideration shall therefore include these converging and diverging elements of monism and dualism.

The experiences of the states under review reveal that a constitutional regime regarding the domestic status of treaties is not supposed to change abruptly from one doctrinal approach to another. Building up a legal regime on the basis of the existing constitutional order is more appropriate for Indonesia. It is therefore suggested that Indonesia optimizes its legal regime by reconstructing the existing legal framework rather than creating a completely new framework. The reconstruction should clarify the vague legal constructions and fill the gap that exists in the current order, resulting from the lack of doctrine. For this purpose Indonesia needs to have clearer constitutional provisions and at the same time it has to fix the existing constitutional ambiguities arising from the distorted practice. The legal concept available at the theoretical level may provide helpful directions.

3. Parliamentary Participation

Indonesia is already equipped with democratic constitutional infrastructures that may serve to build up a clearer legal regime with regard to the question of the status of treaties in domestic law in which parliamentary participation may be well facilitated. There exist sufficient state organs that are basically required for a modern state, inter alia, President, Parliament, and also the various types of judicial institutions. The treaty-making power can be properly allocated among the state organs.

The existing constitutional arrangement has, however, invited criticism for its ambiguity. The simple and ambiguous provision under the Constitution as such could be widely interpreted in a manner that Parliament is involved in all stages of the treaty-making process and gives consent to all treaties. The clarification made by Law No. 24 of 2000 on Treaties which technically modified the original meaning of the provision of the Constitution, has appeared to constitute unintentionally a quasi-constitutional amendment and given rise to the question of constitutionality. For a coherent system, this constitutional defect must be fixed so that all parliamentary powers should only be given effect by the Constitution.

The subsequent practices of treaty-making of the states under review, in light of the proliferation of subject matters that require parliamentary approval, have suggested that parliamentary participation should not necessarily be determined on the basis of a distinction between its legislative function and oversight function. The existing constitutional setting, which tends to regard the law approving a treaty as either merely a legislative product (within the ambit of legislative function) or otherwise merely a formal expression of parliamentary approval, is not helpful in describing the proper role of Parliament. The current democratic system has prompted an extensive participation of Parliament in all matters that are related to political and economic strategic interests as well as matters that may affect the rights and obligations of individuals. In this regard, the outcome of parliamentary approval, in the form of statutory law, shall be attributed to the general function of Parliament without necessarily referring to the distinction between those functions. Parliamentary participation may embrace all matters within the ambit of legislative function, oversight function as well as budgetary function. Therefore, all functions are equally necessary and should be attached to parliamentary participation in treaty-making.

4. Criteria of Treaties that require Parliamentary Participation

The criteria as set out in Law No. 24 of 2000, which are on the basis of a general description of subject matters, are no longer adequate for two main reasons. First, the criteria should be stipulated in the Constitution instead of the lower legislation as it stands now, since this very matter relates to the allocation of constitutional powers which belong to the Constitution. Second, these criteria greatly emphasize on politically-heavy matters concerning the very existence of the state and exclude, in most parts, matters that affect the rights and obligations of individuals which fall under the legislative domain. As apparent from the comparative outlook, legislative power is nowadays vested in Parliament. On the other hand, there is a growing number of treaties intended to produce legislative effects. It is therefore compelling to include matters that are subject to legislation in the criteria. The inclusion of matters of legislation into the criteria will prevent the drafting out of legislation through backroom deals without parliamentary control. Other important matters that carry political and economic strategic interests of the state may be added to the criteria.

The criteria on the basis of constitutional separation of powers between Parliament and President are apparently more feasible than making a distinction between a political and an executive/technical nature of a treaty. The complexity and wide range of subject matters covered by treaties under globalization have created difficulties in drawing such distinctions in the practice. It is not always easy to assess treaties as technically and politically important. Therefore, other treaties which do not fall into the category of those that require parliamentary approval shall relate to matters that are, according to the Constitution, exclusively under the purview of government powers.

The existing legal framework raised a problem because the subject matters that are qualified to be embodied in a statutory law should be according to a set of criteria, determined by Treaties Law No. 24 of 2000 and Law No. 12 of 2011 on Legislation. The former deals with criteria of treaties that are subject to parliamentary approval in the form of statutory law, and the latter determines what subject matters should be embodied in statutory law. The criteria set out by the two Laws overlap and are uncoordinated, which seemingly reflects the differences in legal thought between experts of constitutional law and international law. They bring about great disparities in terms of their subject matters and thus the two laws need to be synchronized.

The criteria for having a treaty approved in the form of a statutory law need to be revised. As suggested above, it is preferable that the criteria shall be construed on the basis of, and therefore covering, all parliamentary functions. The first criterion concerns treaties that contain subjects of legislative matters. Treaties regulate matters which, according to prevailing regulations, shall be the content of a statutory law. This must then be submitted to Parliament for approval and acquire the order of execution in the form of statutory law. The second criterion concerns matters that effect strategic interests of Indonesia, over which Parliament performs the function of oversight or monitoring control. These may be matters concerning political and economic strategic interests, the application of which will affect the very existence of Indonesia as an independent state. These treaties may not necessarily affect the rights and obligations of individuals and may be outside of legislative matters. The most frequently quoted treaties under this criterion are, inter alia, boundary treaties; defense and security treaties; and friendship treaties. For these treaties, the statutory law may only grant authorization to the President to ratify them. The third criterion concerns treaties relating to state budget. This kind of treaty generates financial burdens for which a specific financial plan shall be allocated in the state budget. Loan agreements or memberships to international organizations that involve financial contribution belong to this kind of treaty as well.

As envisaged from the comparative analysis, the government decision determining that a treaty according to its subject matters requires no parliamentary approval may be subject to constitutional dispute. It may lead to the abuse of power and result in arbitrary decisions if the discretion is entirely left to the government unchecked. The model of the Netherlands, where the Parliament is empowered to decide otherwise, would apparently prevent such abuse. Upon the submission of the list of treaties under negotiation to Parliament, the government may indicate that the treaties in question do not require parliamentary approval but, on the contrary, Parliament may decide, on the basis of its own interpretation according to the criteria that the treaties shall be subject to its approval.

5. Modes by which Treaties are incorporated into Domestic Law

The comparative analysis offers various options concerning the modes for granting domestic validity of a treaty where all of the options have already been interchangeably adopted in the practice and held by scholars in Indonesia. As a former colony of a monist state, Indonesia is not unfamiliar with the monist-adoption mode because it had practiced this approach in its early years of independence and therefore, in terms of legal tradition, its legal system was rooted in a monist basis. The dualist-transformation mode has also found its expression in the legal practices in Indonesia. Since 1974, there has been a growing tendency which considered the law approving a treaty as constituting transformation by which the treaty becomes valid in domestic law. Now, there exists another variant of the transformation mode where the law approving a treaty is still regarded as a formal expression of parliamentary approval but separate transformation legislation is still required for granting domestic validity to the treaty.

Indonesia is also familiar with providing reference provisions in domestic law by which a treaty may acquire domestic status upon its entry into force. Despite the fact that the mode may effectively give effect to a treaty in domestic law, the scope of this mode is still limited to specific treaties and is not expected to provide a general rule which applies for all treaties. This mode may, however, complement a general mode, particularly in determining the special status of a given treaty with regard to its hierarchical rank.

As a former colony of a monist state, the monist tradition continues to occupy the mindset of policymakers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Indonesian position towards the UN Human Rights Body can be described as one that is aimed at carrying out its international obligations faithfully at the domestic level, without giving due regard to possible dualist barriers. Historical facts point out that dualism does not belong to the Indonesian tradition – Indonesia was never influenced by the common law dualist system and it was never persuaded by the dualist thinking of Triepel or Anzilotti. Tendencies to portray a dualist posture in its subsequent legal practices should not to be misunderstood as a proper dualist attitude taken up by Indonesia. It is an expression of public sentiment in Indonesia that international law is nothing but international morality, or that this branch of law is not familiar to Indonesia. In this regard, a dualist perspective is not only seen as unfamiliar to Indonesia but also as not having a basis in its legal system.

Globalization meanwhile has given rise to the need for protecting the legal interests of domestic law in light of the pressures arising from democratic legitimacy. The idea of democratic legitimacy finds its expression in the current political setting where the principle of rule of law (Rechtsstaat), democracy, as well as checks and balances are high on the political transformation agenda. The political attitudes arising from the current democratic transition has induced many policymakers to pursue a dualist preference, as has been indicated by a number of cases brought to courts, in which a greater call for shielding domestic law from international intrusion has been expressed. The two aspects shall therefore play an important role in the policy options by which a radical monist as well as a strict dualist mode becomes untenable. The best mode Indonesia could adopt may be reached by reconciling the interest of democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, and removing unnecessary legislative burden, on the other.

The monist-adoption mode had been practiced by Indonesia in the earliest period of independence but was then gradually abandoned in the wake of nationalism and constitutionalist pressure that arose in the subsequent period. The monist character of the first mode might not impress constitutionalists in Indonesia at the present stage, at a time when democratic values play an increasingly important role on the political agenda. Constitutionalists developed a constitutional law during the pre-reform regime in favour of nationalism by which they have been more accustomed to domestic legislations than to treaty rules. The presence of treaty rules in domestic law without the cover of domestic legislation as envisaged by this mode will invite strong resistance from those legal enforcers who are mostly unfamiliar with treaties that have not been incorporated into legislation.

The dualist-transformation may look compatible to the existing legal practice but it is not free from distorted constitutional features. The first concerns the allocation of powers among constitutional organs that are involved in the treaty- making. From the inception of the state, treaty-making power in Indonesia was not under the exclusive competence of the executive. Indonesia has therefore not subscribed to the constitutional distinction between treaty-making by executive and treaty implementation by legislature as is widely known in dualist states. The application of dualist transformation in Indonesia will create a procedure where the same organs will conclude a treaty and transform it into domestic legislation in a separate arrangement. This procedure will be excessive because there will be two different statutory laws for the same treaty i.e. the law approving the treaty for ratification and the law transforming the treaty into domestic law. In this regard, Indonesia should not subscribe to a mode that requires it to enact two different and separate laws devoted respectively to the conclusion and the granting of municipal validity of a treaty. From a procedural perspective, the mode will overburden the legislative bodies because with the same procedure they are required to enact two different laws for a relatively similar purpose. The two may actually be given effect by virtue of the same and a single law. Furthermore, two different kinds of parliamentary treatment to a treaty will create a dilemmatic question of great constitutional importance i.e. whether Parliament, having granted the approval to the ratification of a treaty, may reject its transformation into domestic law through the same course of action as may occur in the South African system.

The second problem concerns the place of transformed treaties in the legislative structure arising from the system of Stufenbau. Indonesia subscribes to a hierarchical legislative system based on Kelsen’s Stufenbau that, according to the current law, is divided into eight different levels. The complex situation of this legislative hierarchical system, if applied consistently, will create legal difficulties in placing the transformed treaty rightly in light of so many levels of legislation. It will bring about too many different hierarchical ranks of treaties and give rise to a complex relationship between them in domestic law.

From the substantive perspective, the dualist-transformation mode will not be easily adaptable with regard to certain treaties that are concerned with human values, such as human rights treaties, and financial interests, such as tax treaties. These treaties possess characters that mainly impose restrictions on the free will of the legislatures. The experiences of strict dualist legal systems all over the world have revealed that the dualist principles are increasingly eroded by the intrusive character of human rights treaties in such a way that dualist states are gradually forced to adopt remedial monist-like measures, such as consistent interpretation (Charming Betsy doctrine), the Australian legitimate expectation doctrine (so-called Teoh doctrine), and the British implied incorporation.

The inconsistent views expressed by the Government before the UN Human Rights Bodies have raised significant doubt whether Indonesia is truly applying a dualist approach in respect to human rights treaties. Indonesia has indeed persistently argued that human rights conventions are not self-executing and this view appears to deny their self-executing nature by unconsciously invoking dualist arguments rather than the merits of the provisions. However, Article 7 (2) of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights provides a general rule which gives effect to human rights treaties whereby the treaties become part of Indonesian law upon their entry into force. The argument that the Convention is not self-executing, on the one hand, and the existence of reference domestic provisions declaring that the Convention becomes part of domestic law, on the other, will weaken the assertion that Indonesia applies a dualist approach to human rights treaties. In this respect, human rights treaties may form part of Indonesian law but in the same vein this fact should not necessarily imply that treaties have a self-executing character. This feature is closer to the monist model of the Netherlands. However, on the basis of the same Article, the Government in 2013 expressed a contrasting view in favour of direct application. The inconsistent views overturned the consolidation of either approach, and brought about the process of going nowhere.

Having visited the existing legal frameworks in Indonesia with respect to the relations between treaties and domestic law, it is argued that Indonesia should embrace both elements and seek a point of balance between the two dominating approaches. The most suitable mode for Indonesia is the mode that attempts to reconcile the two extreme approaches and at the same time keeps the balance between an international law-friendly attitude, on the one hand, and democratic legitimacy on the other. From the available options offered by the constitutional orders examined, the doctrine of the order of execution (Vollzugslehre), one of the doctrines prevailing in Germany, would be best suited for the Indonesian legal system. Some valid reasons may, inter alia, justify this policy option:

1. The current practice of Indonesia suggests a mixed approach that amalgamates two models: the German dualist model and the monist model of the Netherlands. This is exemplified through the double meaning given to the law approving a treaty in Indonesian practice. The law approving a treaty was rooted in the model of the Netherlands, which was originally intended to authorize the President to ratify the respective treaty. In the subsequent practice, however, it has been gradually understood by most constitutionalists as ‘transforming’ the treaty into domestic law. The amalgamation of the two doctrines altogether will present ambiguities and raise uncertainties pertaining to the legal status of the given treaty in domestic law. The two prevailing models should therefore be reconstructed in a manner that the two converge into a single coherent approach, embracing both elements. Therefore, the precise legal character of the law approving a treaty, which is still unclear and ambiguous, should be clarified. In this regard, the law approving a treaty should be assigned the function of expressing a formal approval of Parliament (as originally envisaged by the framers of the Constitution) and at the same time it should constitute an order of execution of the treaty in domestic law (as demanded by the subsequent practice).
2. The doctrine of the order of execution has encompassed all constitutional concerns that have occupied most Indonesian constitutionalists so far. First, the sovereignty of the state in granting a treaty access to enter in domestic law is well preserved, because it needs domestic authorization in the form of a national legislation. The domestic law authority is well respected in the sense that it is the domestic law that permits the entry of the treaty into domestic law. Second, the role of Parliament as the popular representation in treaty-making is secured, in which therefore, the democratic legitimacy of the treaty could be upheld.
3. The doctrine could also ease the concern of international law experts because it could bridge the gap between treaties and domestic law as expected by them. International law experts would prefer this as having a closely connected relation to a separated one thus the domestic and external procedures, albeit distinguished, are interrelated and form part of an integrated process.
4. The doctrine does not envisage transformation and therefore does not need to equate treaties with the complex structure of Indonesian legislation. The nature of the legislation as required under this doctrine is only an order of execution, instead of a transforming legislation, thus not all levels of legislation are necessarily assigned to serve as orders of execution.

For adopting the doctrine, there are only two fundamental features that need to be clarified under the present Indonesian legal system. The first feature is that of the date of the entry into force of the law approving a treaty, which is presently distinguished from the date of the entry into force of the treaty itself, which shall be made concurrent. Following the German model, the date of the entry into force of the law should be dependent upon the entry into force of the treaty in Indonesia. The second feature concerns the character of the provisions of the treaty to be applied in domestic law. The provisions shall be linked with the international character of the treaty. The provisions of a treaty applied under domestic law shall retain their character as treaty provisions and consequently the interpretation rules shall be governed by international law.

On the basis of this mode, the domestic courts will treat treaty provisions as having the force of law and may directly apply them in a given case before it without the aid of ordinary domestic legislation. The direct application of such treaty provisions could be realized insofar as the provisions are self-executing or capable to be judicially enforced. The question of non-self-executing provisions is not unfamiliar to the Indonesian legislative system. The Constitution and the umbrella laws normally provide general provisions prescribing that their application shall be stipulated in or, implemented by, the lower legislations. Pending the enactment of such implementing legislations, these constitutional and statutory law provisions cannot be enforced by the courts.

6. The Place of Treaties in the Legislative Hierarchical Structure

In view of adopting a coherent approach consistent with the idea of the order of execution mode, the relationship between the statutory laws and the treaties concerned shall be reconciled by balancing the two different views i.e. that treaties are identical with the laws approving them, and that the two are distinguishable legal instruments. Therefore in order to resolve the perplexity arising from the constitutional practices, the relationship between the two shall be construed according to the following premises:

1. Treaties remain distinct from the laws that give order to their execution; however, the manner in which they are manifested in domestic law should be concurrent in terms of the date they take effect.
2. Under this term, domestic treaty-making and lawmaking are exercised through the same constitutional procedures except in the case of the right to submit the bill, which should remain vested in the president.
3. The statutory laws ordering executions shall serve twofold functions i.e. first, authorizing the president to ratify/accede to a treaty and, second, granting domestic effect to the treaty upon its entry into force to the state.
4. The Constitutional Court may judicially review the laws ordering the execution of treaties. However, a specific procedure should be set out in order to affirm that the law ordering the execution has a unique character distinct from ordinary laws.

The precise and appropriate place a treaty should occupy in the complex structure of the Indonesian legislative hierarchy would become a complicated question underlying the policy option and bring about dilemmatic problems. The use of the form of law for incorporating a treaty and its integration into the legislative structure might likely imply that the process constitutes a transformation mode. Furthermore, the legislative structure under the current system consists of eight levels of legislations, and it is untenable to have all legislations available to perform as an order of execution of treaties into Indonesian law. A general rule should therefore be devised in order to determine what level of legislation is fitting enough to be used as an order of execution, as well as what subject matters should belong to each legislation.

The question of parallel treaties, commonly known in the German system, may arise: whether or not an order of execution in the form of a statutory order is still required for certain treaties if their provisions have already been contained in the existing statutory law. The konkrete Theorie is preferable, thus these treaties require parliamentary approval and a concrete order of execution. The reason for this is simply that the exact parallel legislation hardly exists, even if a piece of legislation provides mutatis mutandis provisions of a treaty, the language used in the legislation differs from the original text of the treaties and may create different interpretations. Parallel treaties thus require their own legitimacy from Parliament.

Other treaties that, according to the subject matters, do not require parliamentary approval should take the form of regulations within the ambit of executive competences i.e. presidential regulations or other administrative regulations depending on the given subject matters and the corresponding competent authorities. Under the prevailing law, there are three levels of executive regulations that belong exclusively within the competence of the President as the Head of Government i.e. government regulations, presidential regulations and ministerial regulations, or regulations enacted by other government organs at the ministerial level.

The form of a government regulation could not be used as an order of execution of a treaty. This kind of law according to Law No. 12 of 2011 concerning Legislations serves only for the purpose of implementing the provisions of a statutory law – a general nature of the provisions of the given law needs to be elaborated or concretized in a number of detailed provisions in the government regulations. Therefore, no government regulation will be enacted in the absence of a clear stipulation by an existing law. A treaty ordered by a statutory law generally does not require that the provisions of the treaty shall be implemented by a government regulation, because the treaty generally contains a set of autonomous provisions for which no further domestic legislation is necessary, apart from the law ordering the execution of the treaty. The government regulations may however be used as implementing legislation to the law ordering the execution of a treaty, but not within the context of granting domestic validity of such a treaty. It will be only for rendering them as self-executing. For example, if a treaty has been approved through a law and requires that state parties set up a national body for the implementation of the treaty, the government regulation may be used to set up this national body.

The only available regulations that may serve as granting domestic validity of a treaty below statutory law level are presidential regulations, and ministerial or equivalent regulations. It follows that a treaty whose subject matters are only within an exclusive authority of a ministry shall be brought to effect by a ministerial regulation, while a treaty whose subject matters involve the participation of various ministries shall be given effect through a presidential regulation. The given treaty will enjoy rank corresponding to the respective legislation according to the legislative structure.

The use of a legislative format as orders of execution of treaties shall be construed in a manner that may fit the legal tradition of Indonesia concerning legislations. Having inherited the legal tradition of the Netherlands, laws and regulations in Indonesia may commonly be identified by two characteristics i.e. the laws and regulations having regulatory (regeling) character and those having ruling (beschikking) character. The former contains general provisions in an abstract manner and are known as proper laws/regulations, while the latter contains a specific prescription to a concrete circumstance. In respect of laws/regulations approving treaties, they serve only as domestic orders to execute the treaty in domestic law by which the provisions remain embodied in the treaties instead of in the laws/regulations. This order character resembles the kind of laws/regulations that possess a ruling (beschikking) character under which they only contain orders and do not transform or rewrite the provisions of the treaty into the legislation. Therefore, the laws/regulations shall be identified as having ruling (beschikking) character instead of regulatory (regeling) character. This legal construction will ensure that the character of the provisions remain in the form of treaty provisions, as envisaged by the monist-adoption mode.

As the provinces and municipalities/cities are empowered to enact their respective regulations, these regulations might be used as orders of execution of treaties insofar as the subject matters fall into their exclusive spheres. Nevertheless, although the subject matters are within their exclusive powers, the central government’s regulations may appropriately serve as the execution orders if the treaties are intended to be applicable to the whole territory instead of specific provinces and municipalities/cities. This is possible because these local regulations are not exclusive and they are still subject to central government regulations. In order to address the concern of the provinces and municipalities/cities, there must be a mechanism allowing them to participate in the treaty-making negotiations on matters that are exclusively under their competences.

As has been suggested above, the laws ordering the execution of treaties are legislative products with a distinct feature and therefore are reasonably subjected to constitutional scrutinizing. Indonesia has a Constitutional Court which partially resembles that of the German model. Thus the question of the constitutionality of a treaty by virtue of the law ordering its execution may arise, as is frequently experienced by the German Constitutional Court. The case of the judicial review of the ASEAN Charter which was brought before the Constitutional Court in recent times gave rise to the need to resolve this issue. Even if Indonesia subscribes to an adoption approach which is closer to a monist perspective, there is no democratic reason under the present democratic legal system why the constitutionality of the law ordering the execution of a treaty cannot be tested. On the other hand, the decision by the Constitutional Court that might declare a treaty unconstitutional and therefore null and void will create unnecessary effects by which Indonesia violates its international obligations. The constitutionality test however should have been taken with a distinct procedure in a way that promotes compliance to international law. The preferred solution for Indonesia is to provide balance between the two premises that mutually negate each other by allowing a treaty to be constitutionally tested without creating unnecessary international obligations. This outcome could be attained by adopting the German practice, and developing greater legal clarification on constitutional procedures. Within this context, Indonesia should prescribe a constitutional procedure, posing some restrictions by which a treaty upon the enactment of the law ordering its execution may be submitted for judicial review to the Constitutional Court within a specific time limit. Within that limit, the President should not ratify the treaty as yet, pending a Constitutional Court ruling on the case. Following the lapse of the time limit, the President may proceed to the ratification and by then no submission of judicial review would be constitutionally acceptable.

****

 

[1] The Author aqcuired its Doctoral degree on International Law from the Goethe University of Frankfurt and currently  the Secretary to Directorate General for Legal Affairs and Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia.  This Article is entirely his own personal and academic views.

[2] The Indonesian term DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) corresponds to the Indonesian House of Representatives (hereinafter ‘House of Representatives’). The House of Representatives is considered as the Indonesian Parliament. In this writing, the term ‘parliament’ or ‘parliamentary’ will refer to the House of Representatives.

	THE COURTS AND TREATIES: INDONESIA’S PERSPECTIVE Damos Dumoli Agusman[1] [email protected] perjanjianinternational.blogspot.de

Paper presented at the International Conference on the Progressive Development in International Law: Theory and Practice that will be held on 25 – 27 September 2013 at the Faculty of Law Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung.

Are Indonesian Courts bound by a treaty to which Indonesia is a party? Are its judges free to apply international rules? These simple questions are unfortunately encountered with legal difficulties. Although Indonesia inherits the monist-tradition of the Dutch colonial power (the tradition of which all binding treaties are always domestically applicable before the courts), the question of enforceability of treaties is still open under the current Indonesian legal system, which is far from certain. Neither constitutional provisions nor legal doctrine is yet satisfactory in dealing with this compelling question. Scholarly views are also divided on this particular issue and have to some extent added to the legislative ambiguities, inconsistent government practices, and unpredictability in the Court decisions.[2]

            It has been traditionally argued that domestic courts find obstacles in the way of direct application of international law because of the notions of state sovereignty, separation of powers and the principle of legality[3] under dualist pretext over the relationship between international law and domestic law. Nevertheless, using international law in domestic courts under modern legal jurisdiction has widely been accepted.  Even in that dualist legal system, where international law is relatively isolated from domestic law, the use of international in deciding the case, albeit in various modes, has been a common practice.[4]

            Constitution of 1945 as recently amended including existing legislations, state practices, as well as legal doctrines,  are still silent on the question whether or not international law may be directly invoked and enforceable under domestic legal system.  Therefore this paper attempts to explore whether the answer to the question is there and available in Indonesian judicial attitudes. How and to what extent Indonesian Courts make use of international law especially treaties in deciding cases before it would be the central focus with a view of finding the general trend, if any, with regard to mentioned-above question.

1. Courts and the Judicial Competence

On the basis of the Rechtsstaat principle, judicial powers are set up distinct from other state powers. Article 24 A of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia rules that the judicial powers shall be independent with the authority to organize the judicature in order to uphold law and justice. Under the present Constitution, the judicial powers are vested in two distinct courts and one commission:

(a)   The Supreme Court with its subordinate judicatory bodies dealing with general, religious, military, state administrative judicial fields. It has the judicial powers to hear a trial, review legislation lower than laws against such laws, and other powers prescribed by laws.[5]

(b)  The Constitutional Court has the judicial powers to review the constitutionality of laws against the Constitution; it settles disputes concerning constitutional competences of state’s organs, deals with cases concerning the closure of political parties, settles disputes arising from general election, and makes a decision on the opinion of the House of Representatives for the impeachment of the President.[6]

(c)   The Judicial Commission whose tasks are to elect Judges at the Supreme Court and to monitor the conducts of the Judges under the Supreme Court.

It is just recently that the courts are becoming independent as well as impartial. The present independent and impartial status of judicial institutions is also encouraged by a strong public call following the political reform since 1998. Before the reform, as envisaged by the previous Law No. 14 of 1970 on Justice, the courts were under administrative control of the Ministry of Justice (executive) thus leading to the so-called ‘two hat’ controversy[7] whereby judges had two authorities they had to answer to, i.e. to the Minister of Justice for administrative matters and to the Supreme Court for substantive matters. This created doubts on their independence and impartiality. Following the constitutional reform in 2000, as affected by the Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Powers, the Supreme Court and the newly set-up Constitutional Court in 2004 have become independent judicial institutions and take care of their own organization, administrative matters as well as budget.

The Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Powers has provided several judicial principles to be subscribed by Indonesian judges which are related to the function of the courts and the possible access to international law especially treaties. They are, inter alia, as follows:

(a)   Trials by the courts shall be on the basis of laws without any discrimination.[8]

(b)  Judges shall explore, follow and understand the legal values and sense of justice living in the society.[9]

(c)   Judges in making decisions shall convey legal considerations and written opinions.[10]

(d)  The decisions of the courts shall embody legal reasoning and legal basis; and shall quote therein the relevant provisions of the laws or the unwritten laws that are invoked for the decisions.[11]

From those judicial principles, it might be induced that judges shall be independent as well as subject to law. In delivering their judgments they are bound by laws and are given the freedom to seek and explore all legal norms applicable to the cases under examination. It also appears from the existing law that the Indonesian courts do not encounter (or at least the law does not mention it) the typical judicial problem of so-called ‘threats to the independence of courts’,[12] such as the principle of non-justifiability, which (i) prevents them from interfering with foreign policy making by the executive; (ii) prevents them from examining whether the executive acts in accordance with treaties, and the doctrine that the states should speak with one voice; and (iii) from interpreting treaties – because that is a matter for the executive rather than for the courts (separating power constraints[13]). In this regard, nothing under the law prevents judges from applying legal norms contained in treaties in the cases under their examination as long as they are international obligations binding Indonesia.

As Indonesia is rooted in the civil law tradition, and apparently prefers to remain in that tradition, the courts are not bound by the previous decisions of the courts (precedence). However, consideration to the courts’ decisions are very significant to be paid for, as it can explains how the norms are operating and applied in a concrete case.

2. Judicial Attitude towards Treaties

1. a) Introductory remarks

Cases arising directly from the question of the domestic status of treaties in Indonesia are still rare, partly because the domestic law relating to treaties is not yet well developed and there was little legal interest in the Indonesian legal system to have it developed. Consequently, the courts have not yet been enthusiastic to express their perception towards the domestic status of treaties and therefore have hardly indicated any direction and trend with regard to the question. Furthermore, as in most civil law countries, the legal opinions as contained in the Indonesian court’s decisions are mostly short and formal in nature because the judges are not obliged to provide an elaborated reasoning for the decisions. In most cases examined, most arguments relevant to the issue of treaties under domestic law have been elaborated by the parties to the dispute. The responses of the courts are, however, usually less elaborate. Their rulings are relatively short and tend to go straight forward to the decision without making necessary consideration (ratio decidendi) to the arguments submitted by the parties. It is therefore difficult to imply legal determination simply from their decisions only.

From the various interviews with the Indonesian judges and legal practitioners, a small group of judges have held an approach that treaties have been transformed into domestic law by virtue of the laws approving the treaties and will treat them as binding laws.[14] No trend in the case law however convincingly supports this approach. Most judges apparently show indifference towards treaties. The acknowledgement in the legal theory as taught in Indonesia, that treaties are sources of law, apparently does not have any effect to the manner the courts treat and give weight to treaties. According to the prevailing law, treaties are still outside the recognized sources of law in Indonesia and are hardly acknowledged as what the theory dictates. Even to the judges that have good knowledge of international law, treaties are not more important than the laws.[15] Another group of judges recognize the binding force of treaties but in the same vein their application is contingent to the implementing legislations, and will only refer to the treaty provisions if the domestic legislations are not sufficiently clear. [16]

However, there are recently a growing number of court decisions that touch upon and make either direct or indirect reference to treaties. Jurisprudence making reference to treaties is in most cases closely related to globalization related treaties, such as trade and human rights. The Supreme Courts and the Constitutional Courts have recently used provisions of treaties for various purposes, ranging from merely supporting their legal arguments, seeking clarification for interpreting unclear legal principles and provisions, to more authoritative one by invoking them as legal norms. Treaties to which Indonesia is bound have been invoked in most cases before the courts not only as a tool of interpretation for domestic legislation but also for their application to the particular cases. Likewise, the respective party to the case has also attempted to explore and develop arguments on the basis of the provisions of treaties and made necessary references to all resources available within the province of international law.

The establishment of the Constitutional Court has contributed to a growing number of cases relating to international law because it deals mostly with the judicial review of statutes/laws against human rights provisions of the Constitution in which many relevant treaties are closely involved. Although the Constitutional Court does not directly deal with the conflict between the provisions of domestic laws and treaties, it seeks reference from treaties as aids to interpretation to ensure that the constitutionality of the law shall also conform to international law. The Court therefore interprets laws before it in the manner that they are not in conflict with the rule of international law.

To date no case has been reported concerning claims in whole or in part based directly and independently on the provisions of treaties, or reviewing the legality of national acts in the light of treaty obligations or concerning interpretation and application of treaty rules. The Supreme Court as well as the Constitutional Court at the present stage generally apply provisions of a treaty in the context of, and connected with, the application of domestic provisions. They normally use treaties as tools of interpretation to the issue arising from the provisions of domestic legislations. The mainstream approach still puts emphasis on domestic provisions and will refer only to treaties if the domestic law is not clear with regard to the given case or an additional clarification is still required to clarify a vague domestic legal concept.

1. b) Survey of Judicial Practice

(i) Guiding Principle in the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi)

The Constitutional Court has established a guiding principle underlying the use of international law in deciding a case. In a case concerning judicial review of the blasphemy law involving religious freedom, the Constitutional Court holds that the compliance of Indonesia to international law including treaties is characterized by, and shall be in accordance with, the philosophy of the state as well as the Constitution.[17] It impliedly suggests that the Constitution is supreme to international law.

(ii) Treaty Rules applied as authoritative

There is a number of cases that are directly concerned with the application of the provisions of a treaty to a dispute. The Supreme Court, which mostly deals with private cases, encountered cases relating to intellectual property rights, for which appropriate treaties are relevant. In its decisions in 1990 the Court invoked international obligations of Indonesia arising from the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 to which Indonesia is a party.[18] The Court made a ruling by applying the provisions of the Convention. In a number of similar cases, the Supreme Court has applied the provisions of treaties particularly concerning the protection of so-called well-known trademarks as stipulated in the Paris Convention and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS) to which Indonesia is a party. In a trademark dispute,[19] where the Court was requested by a party to annul a registration of a well-known trademark by another party, the Supreme Court applied Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property which led to a decision in favour of the requesting party.

As an archipelagic state comprising a huge economic exclusive zone, Indonesia encounters an increasing number of cases on illegal fishing in the zone. The cases before the courts mostly involve the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS 1982 which are applicable in the zone. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court cites Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS 1982 concerning the prohibition of imprisonment for the violations of fisheries law in the zone.

In Yu Yuen Jun[20] and Lao Chong[21], decided respectively in 2007 and 2009, albeit contended by the defendant on the basis of Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS 1982, the Supreme Court ignored the prohibition contained in the Convention and kept imposing imprisonment without any legal clarification why the Court was not bound by the treaty provision. The compliance to the provision has been increasingly held in the subsequent cases. In the Bui Ngoc Sanh case decided recently in 2012, a captain of a Vietnamese fishing ship was arrested on the allegation of illegal fishing within the economic exclusive economic zone of Indonesia in Natuna Sea. The Court of first instance (District Court) endorsed a punishment with 6 month in jail. The defendant brought the case to the Higher Court by invoking Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS 1982. The Higher Court then held:

According to Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS 1982 or Article 73 (3) the Law No. 17 of 1985, it is prohibited to impose imprisonment for violations of fisheries law in the exclusive economic zone…therefore the Judgment of the Court in the first instance should be corrected to the extent of the penalties imposed to the defendant… [22]

The Compliance to the provision of the UNCLOS in a similar case in 2012 continues to be held, where fines were imposed to the defendant without involving imprisonment by making reference to the provision of the Convention. [23]

Apart from cases concerning violations of fishing law in the economic exclusive zone, there was also a case arising from the application of provisions of the UNCLOS 1982 concerning the right of innocent passage in territorial sea. In the Chen Guo Ping case, a captain of a Chinese fishing ship who was accused of illegal fishing in the territorial sea of Indonesia in the Aru sea, was released by the District Court in Timika on the account that there was no evidence to prove that the defendant was only exercising innocent passage and nor prove that the defendant violated the fishing law. In the appeal proceeding, the prosecutor built up arguments invoking the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS 1982 and arguing:

The Court of first instance has wrongly understood the meaning of innocent passage. It should have considered other relevant rules pertaining to the issue and in this regard what it should mean according to the UNCLOS 1982 which has been ratified by the Law No. 17 of 1985 and the Law No. 6 of 1996 concerning Indonesian Waters. One of the activities that is prohibited by Article 19 (2) the Law No. 17 of 1985 concerning Ratification of the UNCLOS 1982 is fishing. According to the Convention, ships while exercising innocent passage shall stow their fishing gear and equipment. It is evidenced from the witnesses that upon the arrest the fishing gear and equipment were not stowed, and one ton of fishes were found in the vessel.[24]

Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case where it could otherwise pronounce some ruling concerning the meaning of innocent passage under the Convention because it rejected the appeal on the ground of procedural constraint, under which the prosecutor could not bring the case for appeal because in the Court of first instance, the defendant was unconditionally released from the charge. Under the procedural law, the Supreme Court could only accept the appeal if the judgment of the Court of first instance does not amount to unconditional release. Had the Court of first instance released him under specific conditions, the Supreme Court should have dealt with the merits of the case.

The Court of first instance in Jayapura gave due regard to treaties in general in a case concerning the imprisonment of a 15 year old child that committed a crime. The Prosecutor charged the child for criminal offence and asked the Court to impose imprisonment. The Court held that:

In deciding the sentence, the Court should take into consideration international conventions concerning the rights of child as well as the laws concerning child protection. In this regard, taking into account that the defendant is still teenager and attending junior school, especially having due regard that prison devoted for children is not yet available in this region, the imprisonment sentence will negatively affect the physiological development and the future of the defendant…. The Court therefore, while finding that the defendant is guilty, decides to return the defendant to his parent.[25]

The Supreme Court directly applied the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to cases involving and affecting foreign embassies. In two separated cases concerning the land title of the diplomatic premises used by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia[26] and Malaysia[27], private persons brought claims that the lands used by the two embassies belonged to them and asked the Court to annul the land certificates that had been issued by the Government for these embassies. In the two cases, the Supreme Courts rejected the claim of the applicant on the ground of diplomatic immunity and inviolability of diplomatic premises as stipulated in Articles 29 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.

Although the judgments are not free from criticism on a different ground,[28] the Supreme Court appears to apply directly the provisions of the Convention without necessarily having examined whether or not there exists domestic legislation that give domestic effect to the Convention. Until today, Indonesia has no domestic law or regulation concerning diplomatic immunities apart from Law No. 1 of 1982[29] approving/ratifying the Vienna Convention and has granted such immunities on the basis of that Convention.

The question of self-executing provisions of a treaty has been raised in a number of cases. In a case concerning intellectual property rights, [30] the requesting parties asked the Supreme Court to apply the Paris Convention by arguing that the Convention in this regard is self-executing. Although the Court decided in favour of the requesting party by which the outcome of the decision confirmed such protection on the basis of a well-known trademark, it failed to address the question whether the Convention itself is self-executing. The decision of the Court was made merely on the technical ground that the Court of first instance has made a wrong measure in the proceeding by rejecting the copy of evidences, a legitimate proof before the Court, although it had been properly legalized. The Court did not consider it necessary to address questions such as whether it is bound to apply treaties ratified by Indonesia nor has it determined whether the Paris Convention is self-executing.

In the recent case concerning the constitutionality of the ASEAN Charter, the Constitutional Court identifies that Article 1 (5) of the Charter, which establishes an ASEAN free trade area and which is claimed by the applicants as violating the Constitution, could not be automatically effective[31] because the next paragraph of the Article (Article 1 (6)) stipulates that: Member States shall take all necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership. It may be implied from this particular decision that a treaty norm is non-self executing if the wording of the norm so indicates. It is to confirm that the Court does not invoke a dualist pretext to deny the self-executing nature of a treaty norm.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also applied a provision which is clearly non-self-executing by virtue of its merits. In a case concerning industrial design[32] where the Supreme Court was requested to revoke the registration of an industrial design on the ground that the design was not new, a provision of the TRIPS Agreement that is clearly non-self executing[33] was apparently invoked. It held that:

According to Article 2 (2) of the Law No. 31 of 2000, Industrial Designs are regarded new when on the date of registration it was not similar to ones that existed before. According to Article 25 (1) of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods designs are not new or original if they do not significantly differ from known designs or combinations of known design features.

Contrary to the cases above, in some exceptional cases the Supreme Court has denied the application of a treaty to which Indonesia is a party. The Court of first instance in the Apriliany Case[34] concerning the liability of air carriers for luggage lost, which was eventually confirmed by the Supreme Court, declined to apply the provisions on liability of the Warsaw Convention 1929 for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air on the account that the application of the provisions of the Convention to this particular case would create unfairness in Indonesia. The Court, while acknowledging the provisions of the Convention as applicable rules to the case, preferred to apply domestic rules in order to obtain a more fair outcome.

The case of PT. Nizwar v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare (NMB) in 1981 is a controversial landmark case, which involves directly a question of domestic status of a treaty, i.e. the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, which the Supreme Court declined to directly apply. The case concerned the enforcement of foreign arbitral award in Indonesia where NMB, the winning party, attempted to seek its execution under Indonesian jurisdiction. The Court of first instance on 10 June 1981 granted the request for the enforcement of the arbitral award on the ground that Indonesia was bound by the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 by virtue of state succession principle from Dutch colony.[35] The Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Court of first instance and rejected the assertion that Indonesia was bound by the Geneva Convention of 1927 by holding that in principle and according to Indonesian jurisprudence foreign court judgments cannot be enforced in Indonesia unless there is agreement between Indonesia and the foreign state concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments. The Court further rejected the state succession principle by arguing that despite Indonesia being bound by the state succession agreement by virtue of Article 5 of the ‘Round Table Agreement 1949’ between Indonesia and the Netherlands, this did not necessarily mean that Indonesia is bound by treaties to which the Netherlands was a party. The reason invoked by the Court was that the treaty was concluded when the world was dominated by colonial powers and therefore the state succession principle was a product of the situation. Apart from these rulings, the Supreme Court also endorsed its views concerning the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, which was ratified by Indonesia by means of Presidential Decree No. 40 of 1981 on 5 August 1981 when the Court examined the case. The Court, however, deemed it necessary to express it in order to render certainty towards the New York Convention. The Court held that:

The denial to the request for the recognition of enforcement of foreign arbitral award is due to the fact that the implementing legislation concerning foreign arbitral award is not yet enacted. Therefore, the Supreme Court should wait for the enactment of the implementing legislation in order to recognize and enforce the foreign arbitral award.[36]

The Supreme Court judgment on this case immediately invited criticism from various scholars. Some scholars indicated that the Court attitude towards the New York Convention reflects the dualist approach.[37] The prominent scholar on private international law, Sudargo Gautama, argued, inter alia, that implementing legislation is not necessary because the fact that Indonesia is bound by the Convention by the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 40 of 1981 sufficed to provide legal basis for the enforcement. In this regard he further argued that the Presidential Decree ratifying the Convention renders it self-enforcement effect.[38] T.M. Radhie tried to explain the Court’s rejection on the basis of the non-self-executing nature of the Convention but finally he found the Convention was self-executing.[39] The scholarly debate on the self-executing status of this question was not properly developed and unfortunately acquired no further response from other scholars. The controversy over the status of the Convention was resolved after the Supreme Court endorsed the Supreme Court’s Regulation No. 1 of 1990, which laid down administrative procedures on how the foreign arbitral award was enforced by the Court. It prescribed that the exequatur was required from the Supreme Court for the foreign arbitral award to be enforced and it might be requested through the District Court in Central Jakarta. Since then, the debate on this particular issue in light of monist-dualist perspective is fading away.

The legal reasoning of the Supreme Court did not properly address the question why it still required implementing regulations. It was not clear whether the implementing regulations was required in order to make the Convention become part of Indonesian law (question of domestic validity of the Convention) or just to enable the provision of the Convention executable (question of non-self executing provisions). However, in the preamble paragraph of the regulation it was stated that the existing procedural law was still absent concerning execution of foreign arbitral awards. The fact that the merely administrative procedure could enable the Convention to be domestically enforced suggests that the problem underlying the non-enforceability of Convention at that time was merely the lack of administrative procedures as required by Article III of the Convention.[40] If it is the case, it became closely related to the doctrinal problem associated with the controversy of self-executing or non-self-executing question debated in the United States and the states of the European Union. It might be presumed that the Supreme Court did not actually deny the domestic validity of the Convention by virtue of Presidential Decree but simply could not execute the foreign awards because of the lack of procedural rules. In terms of legislation, the Supreme Court’s regulations are hardly carrying legislative weight and therefore could not be regarded as giving effect to transformation/adoption of the Convention into domestic law.

The suggestion that the Supreme Court does actually not deny the domestic validity of the New York Convention finds clearer expression in a number of cases[41] involving the Convention concerning the request for the annulment of the arbitration award. In the recent case, the Supreme Court applied directly the provision of the Convention concerning the annulment of foreign arbitral awards, by stating:

The New York Convention of 1958, which has been ratified by the Presidential Decree No. 34 of 1981 and therefore has become the norm of national law, has stipulated that the annulment of the arbitral awards may only be done in the state or according to the law where the award was granted.[42]

In a number of cases the courts have encountered questions concerning the application of treaties to the given cases to which they have not delivered clear judgments. The parties to the various disputes have attempted to raise important legal arguments which have given the courts the opportunity to reveal their attitude towards the status of treaties under Indonesian law. Unfortunately, the courts have not yet used the opportunity for making any ruling in this regard. Instead, the courts have commonly escaped from addressing the question by invoking procedural matters. In the case concerning religious freedom mentioned above, the independent expert from the requesting party asked the Constitutional Court to make a ruling that the Constitution shall be adjusted if it is in conflict with treaties. The Court, however, declined to make such a ruling by arguing that the power to amend the Constitution is vested in the People’s Consultative Assembly. The Court argued that it was only empowered to review the laws against the Constitution and not authorized to review the Constitution.[43]

In a case concerning judicial review of the status of Circular Letter of the Cabinet of 1967, which stipulates the changing terminology used for China, from the word ‘Tionghoa’ to be ‘Cina’, the requesting party asked the Court to hold that the Letter violated the Law No. 29 of 1999 approving/ratifying the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Court, however, declined to make a ruling on this question on the procedural ground by arguing that the time limit for the application of such judicial review had elapsed because the prevailing rule of procedure of the Court prescribes that the date line for a law to be submitted for judicial review shall be not longer than 180 days from the date of its issuance.[44]

The Supreme Court has also been silent on the public controversy involving the question of the application of treaties. The question on the legality of using one of the accused as a ‘crown witnesses’ against another accused under the same criminal charge was one of the issues in public debate[45] which has been brought to the Court as violating the provision of the ICCPR. Albeit not expressly prohibited under the current criminal procedure code, the practice of examining crown witnesses has been allowed by the Supreme Court and received severe criticism because it amounted to self-incrimination whereby the unfortunate situation compels a person to testify against himself or to confess guilt. In a number of cases[46] it was submitted before the Supreme Court that the use of one of the accused as a crown witness to testify against another accused in the same criminal charge was in violation to Article 14 (3) (g) of the ICCPR to which Indonesia has already been a party. The Supreme Court, however, was reluctant to address the issue and as result the practice continued unchallenged in various subsequent cases.

The courts are also ambiguous in determining the legal weight of treaties. In a case on judicial review concerning the Law No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court,[47] the Constitutional Court dealt with the question of the binding nature of treaties. In this case, the applicant requested the Court to annul, inter alia, Article 4 (1) of the Law No. 3 of 1997, which determined that eight years old is a minimum age for a child to be eligible to be tried before the court. The applicant argued that such minimum age is not compatible with the minimum age determined by international legal instruments and a number of the UN recommendations. In the proceedings, the Government made the following proposition:

One of the competences of the Constitutional Court is judicial review on norms contained in a law including the Law No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court. The Constitutional Court shall use the Constitution as a pillar for the review, while the Court may use treaties as reference ‘ad-informandum’.

The Constitutional Court did not, however, specifically address the government view but it held:

The Court is of the view that treaties, recommendation of the UN Committee on the Rights of Childs and other international legal instruments stipulate that 12 year-old may be used as a comparative tool in order to determine minimum age for a child to be responsible before the law. Nevertheless, the Court holds that international legal instrument and recommendation ‘as such’ could not be used as a tool of review in examining the constitutionality of minimum age for child.[48]

The Constitutional Court was unfortunately ambiguous. While it held in the beginning that treaties may be used as comparative tool, it made on the subsequent paragraph an ambiguous statement by stating that international legal instruments and recommendations (not included ‘treaties’) could not be used as a tool of review ‘as such’. There is no clear indication from the judgment whether or not the Court deliberatively excluded the term ‘treaties’ on this view so that it might induce that treaties may be used as a tool of review. The ambiguity has left the question about the legal weight of treaties before the Court unanswered.

The Constitutional Court in various cases frequently referred to some international instruments to which Indonesia is party but left them undecided in terms of their domestic status. The Court has made reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966[49], the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984,[50] the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988,[51] and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989.[52] The Constitutional Court has hardly made a determination on the domestic status of those treaties due to the nature of its competence whereby it is only authorized to deal with the question of the legality of a law under the case against the Constitution. It seems that references to those treaties are mainly intended to support the arguments concerning the provisions of the laws, which were deemed unclear. The courts, therefore, are not expected to endorse the authoritative nature of the treaties under domestic law. It is interesting to note, however, that the Court has hardly addressed the question whether these treaties are already incorporated into domestic law. The very legal fact that Indonesia is bound by theses treaties and that Indonesia has ratified them at international level was apparently sufficient to regard these treaties as relevant to be invoked. At any case, there was no legal argument of the courts in these cases which rules out the binding force of these treaties to Indonesia on the account of their non-incorporated status.

On the other hand, Indonesian courts have even moved forward to use treaties that are not binding Indonesia. Despite the fact that Indonesia is not party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, it invoked Article 27 on internal law and Article 31 on interpretation in order to ensure that Indonesia had not violated its obligations under a treaty.[53] Unfortunately, the Court neither makes any argument explaining why it applies conventional provisions that are not binding Indonesia nor does it suggests that Indonesia is bound by them by virtue of customary international law.[54] However, the application of Article 31 of the Convention to interpret the provisions of the ICCPR and the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, suggested that the courts may interpret treaties employing rules recognized by international law instead of domestic rules of interpretation.

On a human rights case, the Supreme Court in its decision in 2007[55] makes reference to treaties that Indonesia is not yet a party to. In identifying the crimes against humanity, it invokes reference as envisaged in Article 7 (3) of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court of 1998 by which Indonesia is not yet bound. In the Teuku Bantaqiah case[56] in 2000, the Court dealt with a crime that amounted to a crime against humanity conducted by 24 military personnel and one civilian against Teuku Bantaqiah and 56 of his pupils that were first wounded and later shot dead. The prosecutor charged the defendants with an ordinary crime under the criminal code because crimes against humanity were not yet included in the Code. The Court, however, interpreted the criminal code with the aid of Article 7 (1) Rome Statute and pronounced that such crime amounted to a crime against humanity.

(iii) Treaties as Tools of Interpretation

The courts have also used treaties as a tool of interpretation. In the Teuku Bantaqiah case as cited above, although not directly intending to apply to the case at hand, the Court consulted provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 which had not yet been included in the Criminal Code. The Court stated that states parties are obliged to include all of the acts of torture as a criminal act in their laws, which also applies to anyone who commits, tries to commit, gives assistance to, or is involved in the act of torture. The Court further stated that the states parties are also obliged to ensure that perpetrators of the criminal acts can be punished with a penalty appropriate for that criminal act. In the meantime, the Indonesian Criminal Code has not yet included the act of torture as envisaged by the provisions and, therefore, the Court could only rely on the ordinary criminal law. The Court did not explain the purpose of citing this provision but it appears that the provision was used merely to clarify the meaning of the act of torture and to ensure that the perpetrator was punished by virtue of ordinary criminal law in the absence of the implementing legislation.

Treaties used as aid to interpretation are also developed in the Case on Judicial Review of the Law No. 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights Court.[57] In this case the Constitutional Court was requested to invalidate Article 43 of the Law, which allows the application of the non-retroactive principle by which the Court is authorized to try those perpetrators who committed crimes specified in the Law before the date of its enactment. It had been claimed by the applicant that the Article is in breach of Article 28I (1) of the Constitution, which stipulates that:

The rights to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion, freedom from enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights that cannot be limited under any circumstances.

The Court finally reached a conclusion that the non-retroactive principle is not absolute and subject to restrictive exception, i.e. the principle may be excluded for the sake of recognition and respect of human rights of others. In order to justify this far-reaching assertion, the Court cited provisions of legal instruments to which Indonesia is not a party. The Court, however, put all instruments, whether or not Indonesia is a party, on the same foot without any difference in treatment. The Court cited Article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says that:

In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society;

The Court also invoked Article 15 (2) of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides provision similar to that of ICCPR. The provision states:

Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations…

In a case on judicial review of the Law No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics, the Constitutional Court addressed the important point raised by the Applicant, which argued that the death penalty stipulated in the Law violates the ICCPR which prohibits it. In respect to the issue the Constitutional Court stated:

…legally, the legal nature of binding force of international law is coordination legal order… the assertion by the Applicant could only legally relevant if by the stipulation of death penalty in its domestic legislation, Indonesia has violated its international obligation arising from a treaty. The spirit underlying the ICCPR is indeed the abolition of death penalty but it does not prohibit state parties to apply death penalty provided that the crimes committed are the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime… thus the inclusion of death penalty in its domestic legislation has not constituted a violation of its international obligation arising from a treaty.[58]

The Court then held that the Law No. 22 of 1997 is the implementation of Indonesia’s obligations arising from the UN Convention on against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 and the crimes referred to in the Law are crimes that are according to the Convention particularly serious. The Court then concluded that by virtue of the Convention as interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the stipulation of death penalty under the Law No. 22 of 1997 is an implementation of treaty obligation under the Convention and the crimes referred to are the most serious crimes for which ICCPR does not prohibit the application of death penalty. The Constitutional Court in this case interpreted domestic law in a manner presuming the law did not constitute a violation of an international obligation of Indonesia arising from a treaty. But it is worth noting that the Court did not examine whether or not the provision of the ICCPR has been incorporated into domestic law before it considered whether there was a conflict between the Law and ICCPR. The Court only acknowledged that there is an international obligation arising from ICCPR but did not clearly confirm whether such obligation is binding in domestic law.

3. Evaluation

The growing number of judicial decisions that cite treaties recently demonstrates that treaties have become well-recognized legal instruments for Indonesian courts. There is no doubt that, on the one hand, the courts may apply treaty provisions to the case at hand without and by virtue of national legislations. On the other hand, the attitude of the courts towards treaties as demonstrated in a number of cases above does not reveal any clear indication on the question of the status of treaties under domestic law especially with regard to the method on how the legal system incorporates treaties under domestic law.

It appears from the judicial attitude that there is no consistency with regard to the courts treatment accorded to treaty norms. Neither the law nor the courts could provide clarification as to whether treaties they have invoked are applicable law of the forum and, if not, to what extent judges are allowed to apply such treaties. Nor it is clear whether by making such treaty references, treaties as referred to are regarded by the courts as legal sources of law in the sense that they are authoritative applicable law and are allowed by the courts as of right; or whether they are simply used as evidences to an existing statutory norm without authoritative weight and perceive them simply as non-formal sources of law due to their significance in terms of their legal consideration. It might be the case that the courts resort to treaties on the account that the provisions of Constitution and laws reveal ambiguities and uncertainties and take alternative courses of interpretation possible for the purpose of arriving at a solution most conductive to reason and justice. Transformation and adoption modes are interchangeably presumed under the judicial practices.

The fact that Indonesian courts also make reference to treaties to which Indonesia is not a party may raise legal questions related to the treatment of treaty norms. There is no clear indication from the arguments of the courts whether the legal weight of these non-binding treaties shall be distinguished from those that bind Indonesia, even for the purpose of providing aid to interpretation, since such a distinction is not always taken into account. Consequently, the answer to questions such as what the legal basis would be and to what purpose the invocation of a non-binding treaty provision should be is still unclear.

It is, however, quite clear that the courts have neither prescribed that the validity of a treaty in question shall depend on transforming legislation nor stipulated that such a treaty shall be transformed in a national legislation to be applicable in the given case as envisaged by a strict dualist system.

The decision of the Constitutional Court in the recent case concerning the ASEAN Charter, which is expected to clarify the domestic status of treaties, also failed to make a legal determination on this very subject matter[59]. While indicating that the Charter forms part of domestic law, the Court is still ambiguous in explaining how and by what means the Charter becomes domestically valid. Instead of clarifying the means, the Court even made a controversial argument stating that:

‘…since the ASEAN Charter is embodied in the Law No. 38 of 2008, which approved/ratified it,… and as a law it shall be binding the Parties to it, therefore State Parties to ASEAN Charter are bound by the Law’. [60]

Although the Court finds that such an interpretation does reflect the reality since other states are never subject to any domestic law, the Court implies that it is bound to interpret it in that manner because of the undeniable fact that the Charter has been embodied in the Law No. 38 of 2008. Consequently, the Court has for this particular reason recommended that the use of the form law for approving/ratifying should be abandoned.

The Court has not indicated whether or not the Charter has acquired its domestic status by means of the Law, nor has it even declared whether such a domestic status is necessary. Having interpreted the existing constitutional order, the Court has simply stated that the Law No. 38 of 2008 serves as a legal basis for the validity of the ASEAN Charter without making a distinction as to its validity between domestic law and international law. This would erroneously mean that the Law No. 38 of 2008 grants validity to the Charter either in domestic law or international law.

The Court is fully aware that such a conclusion is fallacious. The Court invokes the fact that the Charter embodied in the Law as forcing it to take such a fallacious outcome. In the next paragraph it argues its own conclusion by stating that:

Treaty obligations are not derived from the fact that the treaty is ratified by the law of the Parties but arise because the Parties agree to them by virtue of the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda.[61]

From this view, it appears that the Court is actually reluctant to subscribe to the idea that the Law No. 38 of 2008 grants validity to the Charter but is compelled to come to such conclusion because the Law is intended to provide a basis for such validity. The assertion that the Law grants validity to a treaty does not automatically bring about a conclusive view that it would also constitute the incorporation of the Charter into domestic law. It seems that the Court does not hold the common idea of distinguishing between the entry into force of a treaty at international level and that of domestic level by means of incorporation. It is to suggest that the Court uses a monist line of thinking, by which it holds that once a treaty enters into force to the state, the treaty would automatically be binding in domestic law. The Court decision has therefore not yet contributed to the attempt for seeking a legal determination of the domestic status of a treaty as well as the mode for granting its domestic validity.

****

[1] Graduated from Law Faculty, University of Padjajaran, Bandung; Master Degree on International Law and Politics, University of Hull, England; Former Director for Treaties, Foreign Ministry; Currently Consul General of Indonesia in Frankfurt and Phd Candidate at University of Frankfurt. The view in this paper is not necessarily reflecting the Government view.

[2] Agusman, Damos Dumoli, Hukum Perjanjian Internasional, Kajian Teori dan Praktik di  Indonesia (Law of Treaties, Theories and Practice in Indonesia),  Bandung: Refika Aditama, 2010, 95-143.

[3] Ferdinandusse, Ward, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts, Assers (2006), 221-268.

[4] Under dualist legal system, international law should be transformed into domestic law in order to be available before the Courts. Nevertheless, some juridical techniques have developed so that the Courts may apply international law as if international law was directly applicable, see  Fatimah, Shaheed, Using International Law in Domestic Courts, Oxford (2005).

[5] Article 24 (a) Constitution of 1945 (as amended in 2002).

[6] Article 24 (c) Constitution of 1945 (as amended in 2002).

[7] Timothy Lindsey, ‘Indonesia, Reinventing a Legal System, Too Much, Too Little, Too Late’, in Alice Tay (ed.), East Asia, Human Rights, Nation-Building, Trade (1999), 519.

[8] Article 4 (1) Law of No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Powers.

[9] Article 5 (1) Law of No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Powers.

[10] Article 14 (2) Law of No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Powers.

[11] Article 50 (1) Law of No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Powers.

[12] Nollkaemper, André, National Courts and the International Rule of Law, New York: Oxford University Press (2011), 49-53.

[13] Haljan, David, Separating Powers: International Law before National Courts, Springer (2013), 100-109.

[14] Hadhyono, Suparti. Praktek Penerapan Perjanjian Internasional dalam Putusan Hakim (Treaties

under National Court). Focus Group Discussion, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia-Law Faculty of University Airlangga Surabaya (2008).

[15] Interview with Judge Nameandriani Nurdin, Chief of District Court of Central Jakarta, 7 May 2011 (unpublished, on file with author).

[16] Inteview with Supreme Court Justice, Professor Mieke Komar Kantaatmadja, 28 February 2011 (unpublished, on file with author).

[17] MK, case No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, 275.

[18] Supreme Court Cases on Knirps (1991), Gucci (1992), Giordano (1994), see Sudargo Gautama and Rizawanto Winata, Pembaharuan Hukum Merk Indonesia: dalam Rangka WTO, TRIPS (Reform of Trademark Laws  in Indonesia with Respect to WTO, TRIPS) (1997), 372.

[19] MA, Subway case, No. 736 K/Pdt.Sus/2009, 12-13.

[20] MA, Yu Yuen Jun, No. 893 K/Pid/2007.

[21] MA, Lao Chong, No. 1596 K/Pid.Sus/2009.

[22] PT Pekanbaru, Bui Ngoc Sanh, No. 66/Pid-Sus/2012/PTR, 7.

[23] PT Pontianak, Le Van Thong, No. 104/Pid.Sus/2012/PT.PTK, 11; PT Pontianak, Nguyen Van BE, No. 195/PID.SUS/2012/ PT. PTK, 11/. However, in a similar case, the Higher Court of Pekanbaru while acknowledging the prohibition of imposing inprisonment has pronounced that a sort of short detention (pidana kurungan) may also be applied. The Court argued that accroding to the classification under article 10 of Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP), pidana kurungan is another kind of penalties and is not pidana penjara (‘inprisonment”) meanwhile the prohibition envisaged by the Fisheries Law confines only to pidana penjara. It appears that the Court has interpreted the Criminal Code in  a manner so that the outcome would be incompatible with the article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS because pidana kurungan is also a form of corporal punishment, which is prohibited by the Convention, se PT Pekanbaru, Tran Huu Tuyen, No. 52/PID.SUS/2012/PTR.

[24] MA, Chen Guo Ping, No. 232 K/Pid.Sus/2007, 5-7.

[25] PN of Jayapura (Court of first instance Jayapura), Yanuar Kayoan Umaf case, No. 65/Pida.B/2012/PN-JPR.

[26] MA, Arabic Saudi case, Fatwa No. WKMA/Yud/04/2006.

[27] MA, Malaysia Embassy case, No. 111K/TUN/2000.

[28] It has been argued that the Court should have distinguished between the question on land title, which pertains land law, and the enjoyment of diplomatic immunity. The question whether or not an embassy acquires a good title to land is exclusively determined by land law and has nothing to do with, and shall be distinguished from, the question of diplomatic inviolability. The good title to land of an embassy must be presumed as enjoying diplomatic inviolability, see Agusman, Damos Dumoli. Hukum Perjanjian Internasional, Kajian Teori dan Praktik di Indonesia (Law of Treaties, Theories and Practice in Indonesia).  Bandung: Refika Aditama (2010), 6.

[29] Law No. 1 of 1982 concerning Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 25 April 1982, LN (Official State Gazette No. 2/1982).

[30] MA, Lexus case, No. 194 K/Pdt.Sus/2011, 6-14.

[31] MK, No. 33/PUU-IX/2011, Judicial Review of Law No. 38 of 2008 concerning ASEAN Charter, 189.

[32] MK, Industrial Design case, case No. 022 K/N/HaKI/2006, 20.

[33] Article 25 (1) TRIP’s Agreements states that Members may provide that designs are not new or original if they do not significantly differ from known designs or combinations of known design features. Members may provide that such protection shall not extend to designs dictated essentially by technical or functional considerations. By the wordings of the provision is clearly non-self-executing because it only recommends member states to provide that designs are not new or original by which domestic legislation for that effect is inevitably necessary.

[34] MA, Apriliany case No. 970 K/P-dt/2002, 13.

[35] The succession arrangements were agreed upon under Article 5 of the ‘Round Table Agreement’ 1949 between Indonesia and the Netherlands, under which all rights and obligations to the Netherlands arising from treaties to which it was a party continue to be applicable to Indonesia, see Ko, Swan Sik. The Indonesian Law and Treaties 1945-1990. Dordrecht, Boston, Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1994), 20.

[36] MA, PT. Nizwar v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare; The overview concerning the case may be found in Noah Rubins, ‘The Enforcement and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards in Indonesia’, 20 American University International Law Review (2005) 2, 359-401.

[37] Fifi Junita, ‘Experience of Practical Problems of Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement in Indonesia’, 5 MqJBL (2008), 384-385.

[38] Gautama, Sudargo. Hukum Dagang dan Arbitrase Internasional (Trade Law and International Arbitration). Bandung: Citra Aditya Bakti (1991), 2.

[39] Radhie, T.M. Konvensi New York tentang Pengakuan Pelaksanaan Putusan Arbitrase Luar Negeri (New York Convention on Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards). Working paper delivered at Dispute Resolution through Arbitration Seminar, Jakarta (1990), 24.

[40] Article III New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958: ‘Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles.’

[41] PN of Jakarta (Court of Jakarta District), Karaha Bodas vs Pertamina case No. 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, 21-22; MA, PT Raya Nusantara v. PT Jambi Resources Ltd, 64 K/Pdt.Sus/2010, 43.

[42] MA, PT Raya Nusantara v. PT Jambi Resources Ltd, 64 K/Pdt.Sus/2010, 43.

[43] MK, case No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, 275, 293.

[44] MA, Circular Letter of the Cabinet 1967, case No. 42 P/HUM/TH. 2006.

[45] Setiyono, ‘Eksistensi Saksi Mahkota sebagai Alat Bukti dalam Perkara Pidana’ (Existence of Crown Witness as Evidence in Criminal Cases) , 5 Lex Jurnalica (2007) 1, 29-37; Adi Andojo Soetjipto, Menyongsong dan Tunaikan Tugas Negara Sampai Akhir: Sebuah Memoar (Carry Out and Exert State’s Tasks till the End: A Memoir) (2007), 167.

[46] MA, Ferry case, case No. 72 PK/Pid/2010, 43; MA, JUN HAO case, case No. 143 PK/Pid.Sus/2011, 50.

[47] MK, case No. 1/PUU-VIII/2010, Judicial Review of Law  No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court, 113.

[48] Ibid, 151.

[49] MK, case No. 065/PUU-II/2004, Judicial Review Law No. 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights; MK, case No. 013-022/PUU-IV/2006, Judicial Review of Law of No. 27 of 2004 concerning Commission on the Truth and Reconciliation; MK, case No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007, Judicial Review of Law No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics (2007); MK, case No. 5/PUU-VIII/2010, Judicial Review of Law No. 11 of 2008 concerning Information and Electronic Transactions.

[50] MK, case No. 21/PUU-VI/2008), Judicial Review of Law No. 2/Pnps/1964 concerning the Methods of Capital Punishment.

[51] MK, case No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007, Judicial Review of Law No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics.

[52] MK, case No. 1/PUU-VIII/2010, Judicial Review of Law No. No. 3 of 1997 concerning Child Court.

[53] MK, case No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007, Judicial Review of Law No. 22 of 1997 concerning Narcotics, 420-425.

[54] It is worth noting that, as mentioned above, the ICJ in the Case of Pulau Ligitan and Sipadan, before applying the rules of the said Convention to the case, it needed first to address question arising from the status of Indonesia as a non-party to the Convention before suggesting that Indonesia is bound by the rules of the Convention as customary rules.

[55] MA, Eurico Guterres case No. 34 PK/PID.HAM.AD HOC/2007, 34-35.

[56] PN of Banda Aceh, Teuku Bantaqiah Case, No. 11/Pid.B/Koneks/2000/PN-BNA.

[57] MK, case No. 065/PUU-II/2004, 47-68.

[58] MK, case No. 2-3/PUU-V/2007, 419-421.

[59] Further comments on the ASEAN Charter case before the Constitutional Court may be found in Agusman, Damos Dumoli, Apakah MK bisa Menguji Piagam ASEAN? (Can  Constitutional Court review ASEAN Charter?), ANTARA News (25 July 2011), accessible at http://www.antaranews.com/berita/268734/apakah-mk-bisa-menguji-piagam-asean, last visited on 9 April 2013; Agusman, Damos Dumoli. Arti Judicial Review Piagam ASEAN bagi Sistem Hukum Indonesia (Significance of Constitutional Court’s Judicial Review of ASEAN Charter to the Indonesian Legal System), Opinio Juris, Foreign Ministry,  Vol. 13 Tahun 2013.

[60]  MK, case No. 33/PUU-IX/2011, 194-95; The Court states: Karena Undang-Undang berlaku sebagai norma hukum, maka Negara Indonesia dan negara lain, dalam hal ini negara ASEAN wajib terikat secara hukum oleh UU 38/2008.

[61]  Ibid, 195; The Court states:  Kewajiban yang dibebankan kepada suatu negara oleh perjanjian internasional tidaklah lahir karena perjanjian internasional bersangkutan telah disahkan sebagai Undang-Undang oleh pihak negara lain tetapi kewajiban tersebut lahir karena para pihak dalam hal ini negara-negara sebagai subjek hukumnya telah menyetujui bersama suatu perjanjian. Hal demikian sesuai dengan asas pacta sunt servanda.

Damos Dumoli Agusman[1]

(Dimuat dalam Buku Peran Hukum dalam Pembangunan di Indonesia, Buku Peringatan Purnabakti Prof. Dr. Etty R. Agoes SH, LL.M, Bandung (2013), hal. 256-268)

Abstract

Ditengah-tengah ketidakjelasan tentang status perjanjian internasional dalam sistem hukum Indonesia, MK menguji konstitutionalitas Piagam ASEAN dalam perkara pengujian UU. Amar putusan MK pasti akan menyentuh perdebatan akademis dewasa ini tentang apa makna UU yang meratifikasi Piagam ASEAN (UU No. 38/2008), yang hasilnya bahwa Indonesia menganut teori dualis-transformasi untuk perjanjian internasional. MK memaknai UU ini sebagai UU yang mentransformasi Piagam ASEAN kedalam UU Nasional, namun sayangnya secara bersamaan MK menilai bahwa pewadahan perjanjian dengan UU itu tidak tepat dan menyarankan model ini direvisi. Keputusan MK belum menjelaskan apa-apa tentang masalah status perjanjian dan malah menghadirkan ketidakpastian baru karena semua perjanjian dapat di judicial review.

Hubungan Perjanjian Internasional dengan hukum nasional.

            Dua perkembangan pesat dewasa ini telah membuat sistem Indonesia menggeliat. Pertama adalah perkembangan internal yaitu reformasi ketatanegaraan Indonesia yang ditandai dengan proses demokratisasi dalam bidang hukum untuk menuju suatu sistem hukum modern, dan kedua adalah faktor eksternal yaitu globalisasi yang memaksa kehadiran instrumen asing seperti perjanjian internasional di dalam sistem hukum yang sedang bereformasi.

Akibatnya terjadi benturan antara sistem hukum nasional dengan perjanjian internasional. Sistem hukum yang bereformasi ini telah menekankan aspek konstitutionalitas sehingga memberi batasan kepada kekuasaan negara terhadap rakyatnya, dan sekaligus membatasi kekuasaan negara untuk membuat perjanjian internasional yang selama ini dinikmati sebagai prerogatif Presiden. Konstitusi telah menjadi tolok ukur dalam penyelengaraan negara dan menjadi basis untuk menentukan norma apa yang dapat diterima untuk membatasi kebebasan individu.

            Kondisi ini semakin rumit dengan adanya perkembangan eksternal. Selama ini persoalan konstitutionalitas perjanjian internasional tidak pernah dipersoalkan karena secara konvensional perjanjian internasional difahami hanya sebagai kontrak antar negara dan nyaris tidak berhubungan dengan domain hukum nasional. Secara substansi, konon perjanjian internasional hanya dimengerti sebagai instrumen yang mengatur hubungan antar negara dan tidak mengatur objek internal negara (Treaty binds on states not in States). Akibatnya acapkali perjanjian internasional hanya dilihat sebagai urusan Kementerian Luar Negeri. Saat ini, kedua perkembangan diatas telah semakin mengintensifkan interaksi dan interplay antara perjanjian internasional dengan hukum nasional yang ditandai dengan semakin banyaknya persoalan hukum nasional yang ternyata juga diatur oleh perjanjian internasional. Tanpa disadari, perjanjian internasional dapat memuat materi yang mengatur kehidupan individu.

Akibatnya, terjadi benturan antara perjanjian internasional yang agresif memasuki domain internal dengara dengan hukum nasional yang sedang mengedepankan konstitusi. Akibatnya, pertanyaan tentang konstitutionalitas perjanjian internasional telah mulai menguak ke permukaan,  dengan kata lain telah muncul resistensi konstitusional terhadap perjanjian internasional. Resistensi ini ditandai dengan gugatan judicial review terhadap Piagam ASEAN di Mahkamah Konstitusi. Gugatan ini menguak banyak pertanyaan yang memang tidak pernah disediakan oleh sistem hukum Indonesia selama ini, yaitu apa dan bagaimana kedudukan hukum suatu perjanjian internasional dalam sistem hukum Indonesia? Dimana letak suatu perjanjian internasional dalam sistem perundang-undangan Indonesia? Apakah perjanjian internasional dapat diuji konstitusionalitasnya?

Sayangnya sistem hukum RI belum menyediakan jawaban atas pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut dan selama ini belum merasa perlu memberikan karena memang pemahaman umum tentang perjanjian internasional adalah masih sebatas pada urusan internasional dan jauh dari internal.[2] Ketiadaan jawaban dalam sistem hukum ini mengakibatkan para pakar hukum hanya dapat melakukan interpretasi baik yang bersifat restrictive maupun liberal dan melahirkan banyak versi tafsir tentang kedudukan hukum perjanjian internasional dalam sistem hukum Indonesia.

Dimanakah kedudukan perjanjian internasional dalam sistem hukum Indonesia? Pertanyaan ini memperoleh jawaban yang bervariasi di ruang publik Indonesia baik di kalangan akademisi maupun praktisi. Pemahaman publik tentang perjanjian internasional juga masih beragam mulai dari pandangan yang ekstrim yang bersifat ‘Austian’[3] yang menganggap perjanjian internasional hanya memiliki kekuatan moral, ke arah ekstrim sebaliknya yang menganggap perjanjian internasional adalah instrumen hukum yang dapat mengalahkan norma hukum nasional. Diantara kedua ekstrim itu terdapat pula pandangan yang memberi bobot hukum terhadap perjanjian internasional yang telah diratifikasi oleh Indonesia. Artinya, perjanjian yang telah mengikat Indonesia (a.l. karena Indonesia telah meratifikasi) telah memiliki kekuatan hukum dalam hukum Indonesia.

Di kalangan pakar hukum Indonesia, persoalan yang lebih teknis-juridis juga belum disepakati. Apakah berlakunya perjanjian internasional di level internasional secara otomatis menjadikannya berlaku di hukum nasional? Pro dan kontra terhadap pertanyaan ini semakin mengemuka di perdebatan publik antara para pakar hukum dari berbagai bidang. Tahun 1980’an pakar hukum Indonesia telah pernah disibukkan dengan kontroversi tentang apakah Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards tahun 1958 yang telah diratifikasi oleh Indonesia dapat dipakai oleh pengadilan Indonesia yang diwarnai dengan kasus  PT. Nizwar v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare (NMB) Tahun 1981.^[4] Setelah itu perdebatan tampak mereda namun kemudian sejak reformasi pertanyaan yang sama telah muncul kembali. Kementerian Luar Negeri yang paling terkena dampak akibat ketidakseragaman pemahaman publik tentang perjanjian internasionl telah berusaha mempertemukan berbagai kelompok pakar dari berbagai disiplin ilmu hukum tatanegara dan hukum internasional di dalam rangkaian Focussed Group Discussion^[5], guna memetakan kecenderungan pemikiran yang mungkin dapat dijadikan referensi. Diskusi ini setidak-tidaknya berhasil menginventarisasi berbagai pemikiran yang hidup dikalangan pakar hukum tentang bagaimana mereka memandang status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional. Dewasa ini, upaya pemberantasan korupsi oleh KPK telah pula bersentuhan dengan pertanyaan ini dan melahirkan tema debat baru tentang apakah Konvensi PBB tentang Anti Korupsi yang telah diratifikasi oleh Indonesia dapat digunakan oleh KPK dalam mendakwa pelaku korupsi.[6]

Menilik lesson learned dari negara lain, persoalan ini ternyata harus dihadapi oleh berbagai sistem hukum dan ciri sistem hukum modern salah satunya adalah memiliki jawaban yang tegas dan pasti tentang kedudukan perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional. Berbagai teori mencoba menjawab tentang pertanyaan ini. Pertama, teori dualisme yang memandang hukum internasional dan hukum nasional sebagai dua sistem hukum yang terpisah, akibatnya perjanjian internasional harus ditulis ulang dalam legislasi nasional untuk dapat berlaku di dalam hukum nasional. Menurut teori ini, perjanjian yang mengikat negara di ranah internasional tidak otomatis mengikat di ranah hukum nasional. Perjanjian itu harus di ‘transformasi’ ke dalam hukum nasional dan berubah bentuk menjadi UU. Kedua, teori monisme yang memandang hukum internasional dan hukum nasional sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem sehingga perjanjian internasional dapat berlaku kedalam hukum nasional dalam kualitasnya sebagai norma internasional. Menurut teori ini tidak perlu ada pemisahan antara berlakunya perjanjian internasional di ranah internasional dan ranah nasional karena keduanya berada dalam satu sistem. Penegak hukum dapat menggunakan langsung norma perjanjian dalam wujudnya sebagai norma internasional. Kedua teori ini hidup dalam pandangan para pakar di Indonesia.

Persoalan menjadi lebih kompleks karena persetujuan DPR terhadap perjanjian internasional yang hendak diratifikasi oleh Indonesia dituangkan dalam format Undang-Undang, padahal Pasal 11 UUD 45 tidak mensyaratkan itu. Penggunaan format UU untuk menjubahi persetujuan DPR telah melahirkan ‘spekulasi’ akademis tentang makna UU ini yang terkait dengan pola pikir dualisme dan monisme diatas. Tiga makna telah dilekatkan pada UU ini. Pertama, yang mengartikan bahwa UU ini adalah UU yang mentransformasikan perjanjian internasional yang mengubah kualitasnya dari norma internasional menjadi norma nasional (dualisme). Kedua, yang mengartikan bahwa UU ini hanya persetujuan DPR dan hanya UU dalam arti formal, serta tidak memiliki kualitas sebagai UU yang memuat materi perjanjian. Ketiga, yang mengartikan bahwa UU ini hanya persetujuan DPR dan masih dibutuhkan UU terpisah untuk mentransformasikan perjanjian tsb. Ketiga makna itu sama-sama hadir dalam praktik di Indonesia dan menimbulkan fragmentasi dalam memperlakukan perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional.

2. Dalil Hukum MK tentang Status Perjanjian Internasional

Ditengah-tengah fragmentasi dan ketiadaan doktrin yang baku ini tiba-tiba MK Indonesia diperhadapkan oleh masalah konstitutionalitas perjanjian internasional tentang Piagam ASEAN yang diputuskan pada tanggal 26 Februari 2013.[7] Adalah sejumlah LSM yang mempersoalkan Piagam ASEAN (yang membentuk pasar bebas) sebagai bertentangan dengan UUD 1945.  Pada tgl 5 Mei 2011 mereka mengajukan gugatan ke MK, meminta “judicial review” terhadap UU yang meratifikasinya yakni UU No. 38/2008. Pasal yang dipersoalkan adalah tentang pasar bebas yang dimuat dalam Pasal 5 ayat (2) ASEAN Charter yang menyatakan, “Member States shall take all necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership”

 Dalam gugatan pengujian UU ini MK diharapkan untuk menjawab pertanyaan mendasar diatas. Untuk itu perlu suatu penelusuran kritis terhadap keputusan ini untuk menemukan apakah MK telah menyediakan solusi atau  setidak-tidaknya memberi arah terhadap doktrin yang hendak dianut oleh Indonesia tentang perjanjian internasional.

Dalam amar putusannya, MK Menyatakan menolak permohonan para Pemohon untuk seluruhnya. Artinya, Piagam ASEAN tidak bertentangan dengan UUD. Putusan ini mungkin melegakan Pemerintah karena menjadi terhindar dari kemungkinan pelanggaran kewajiban internasionalnya, namun sampai pada tahap ini amar putusan itu belum menguak apa-apa bagi para pakar hukum khususnya hukum internasional. Bagi kalangan ini, bukan hasil putusannya yang penting namun argumen yang menggiring ke  arah putusan itu, karena argumen ini (sering disebut ratio decidendi) kelak akan menentukan nasib perjanjian-perjanjian internasional lainnya.

Apa ratio decidendi yang dihasilkan oleh MK yang akan berimplikasi pada persoalan status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional?

Pertama, MK mengatakan bahwa lembaga ini berwenang untuk menguji Piagam ASEAN karena dokumen ini tidak lain dan tidak bukan adalah bagian yang tak terpisahkan dari UU No. 38/2008 yang merupakan objek yang sah untuk diuji oleh MK.[8] Karena secara formal Piagam ini adalah UU maka tidak ada alasan bagi MK untuk tidak dapat mengujinya. Argumen ini mengkonstatir salah satu pemikiran dualis yang berkembang selama ini di Indonesia tentang salah satu makna UU ratifikasi, yaitu bahwa UU ini memuat materi Piagam ASEAN. Ini berarti, semua perjanjian internasional yang diratifikasi melalui UU setiap saat dapat diuji oleh MK dan melahirkan suatu risiko hukum tersendiri karena dengan demikian Indonesia tidak mungkin dapat memberikan jaminan kepastian hukum kepada negara pihak dalam perjanjian internasional.

Dari perspektif teori maka MK menafsirkan bahwa UU ini melakukan fungsi transformasi terhadap Piagam ASEAN kedalam hukum nasional seperti yang disyaratkan oleh teori dualisme. Namun dari segi historis, pandangan ini agak baru dan menyangkal pandangan yang hidup sebelumnya khususnya periode awal kemerdekaan RI.  Seperti yang dikemukakan oleh Prof. Utrecht,[9] UU semacam ini adalah UU dalam arti formil (Wet in formele zin). Hal ini tercermin dari penjelasan Utrecht tentang mekanisme Pasal 11 UUD 1945: yaitu suatu perjanjian internasional harus terlebih dahulu mendapat persetujuan DPR dan dituangkan dalam suatu undang-undang persetujuan (goedkeuringswet) yang bersifat undang-undang formil saja. Kemudian, setelah mendapat persetujuan DPR, Presiden melakukan pengesahan yang disebut dengan ”ratifikasi”. Pandangan ini telah diterima secara baku dalam setiap ajaran HTN di Indonesia.

Jurusan yang hendak dituju oleh MK dalam putusan ini agak berseberangan dengan jurusan yang ditempuh Belanda yang mewariskan sistem hukum Indonesia. Pengadilan Belanda pada 2 Januari 1899 menolak argumen bahwa UU ratifikasi (goedkeuringswet) ini adalah UU yang memuat perjanjian internasional. Dalam kasus ”Konvensi Manhnheim on Rhine Navigation (1868), Pengadilan menyatakan bahwa kekuatan hukum Konvensi ini tidak bersumber dari Wet yang mengesahkannya melainkan pada tindakan pertukaran instrumen ratifikasi antara kedua negara (Belanda dan Jerman). Jurisprudensi ini menyelesaikan perdebatan pada waktu itu dan kemudian menjadi politik hukum dalam revisi Konstitusi Belanda tahun 1953 yang secara tegas menempatkan perjanjian internasional sebagai tidak identik dengan UU yang meratifikasinya.

MK tidak memberi alasan khusus mengapa bergeser dari pendekatan warisan Belanda ini, dari yang semula menekankan UU ini dalam arti formal, ke arah UU biasa atau UU yang dikenal pada umumnya. Kelihatannya, MK tidak menemukan alasan yang kuat mengapa UU ini harus dikecualikan dari pengertian UU pada umumnya mengingat baik mekanisme pembentukan UU, maupun pembentuk UU ini tidak ada bedanya dengan UU lainnya. Selain itu, baik UU No. 24 Tahun 2000 tentang Perjanjian Internasional maupun UU No. 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Perundang-undangan tidak menempatkan UU ratifikasi ini sebagai UU yang perlu mendapat status khusus seperti dalam praktik Belanda. Sayangnya MK tidak menggali referensi historis tentang jenis UU ini dan terpaksa terlarut dengan pola pikir baku yang berkembang kemudian yang tanpa sengaja membuat identik antara UU ratifikasi dan UU biasa.

Argumen ini telah menguak politik hukum Indonesia tentang perjanjian internasional yang selama ini masih misteri dan dalam literatur masih diperdebatkan. Dengan tegas MK memberi pesan bahwa selama perjanjian internasional dibuat dalam bentuk UU maka semua perjanjian internasional dapat diuji oleh MK. Artinya, semua perjanjian internasional lainnya dapat diuji dan berpotensi untuk dinyatakan bertentangan dengan UUD. Argumen ini sangat logis dan dapat dipahami. MK telah memilih aliran hukum yang menjadi kontroversi selama ini bahwa UU yang meratifikasi Piagam ASEAN tidak berbeda dengan UU lainnya dan tidak menemukan alasan yang meyakinkan mengapa UU ini harus dibedakan dengan UU lainnya, sekalipun tersedia doktrin atau referensi yang menyatakan sebaliknya.

Argumen apakah Piagam ASEAN ini merupakan UU sudah sering diperdebatkan dalam dunia akademis. Kontroversi ini tampaknya mengemuka dalam perdebatan para hakim konstitusi. Dua Hakim Konstitusi melalui dissenting opinion[10] keberatan dengan argumen yang mengidentikkan UU No. 38/2008 dengan UU pada umumnya. Menurut kedua hakim ini: ‘memang benar, formil UU 38/2008 adalah Undang-Undang, tetapi materilnya bukanlah Undang-Undang dan tidak dapat dijadikan objek pengujian undang-undang yang menjadi wewenang Mahkamah. Selanjutnya ditegaskan bahwa UU ini bukanlah suatu peraturan perundangundangan yang substansinya bersifat normatif, yang adressat normanya dapat secara langsung ditujukan kapada setiap orang, tetapi merupakan persetujuan dari Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat terhadap perjanjian internasional yang telah dibuat oleh Pemerintah untuk memenuhi Pasal 11 UUD 1945, dan diberi ”baju” dengan UU.

Negara berkembang seperti Columbia telah menuntaskan persoalan klasik ini pada awal abad 20. Hasilnya adalah berseberangan dengan pandangan MK diatas. Duduk perkaranya sama dengan yang dialami oleh MK dalam kasus Piagam ASEAN ini. UU No. 14 Tahun 1914 yang meratifikasi Treaty antara AS dan Columbia tentang pengakuan kedaulatan Panama digugat ke Pengadilan Columbia karena bertentangan dengan UUD. Pengadilan Columbia tidak tertarik mengulas tentang apakah benar treaty ini bertentangan dengan UUD, melainkan hanya menjawab apakah Pengadilan memiliki kewenangan untuk menguji UU No. 14 Tahun 1914 dan treaty. Pengadilan ternyata berpendapat bahwa sekalipun UU ini adalah produk legislatif namun tetap harus dibedakan dengan UU pada umumnya. UU ini hanya merupakan wujud ekspresi unilateral dari Columbia untuk mengikatkan diri terhadap suatu perjanjian dan tidak menjadikan perjanjian itu berkekuatan mengikat karena masih tergantung pada tindakan yang sama dari negara pihak lainnya.

Tampaknya terdapat kesulitan juridis bagi sebagian besar hakim konstitusi untuk keluar dari asas legalitas bahwa UU yang meratifikasi suatu perjanjian tidak lain dan tidak bukan adalah UU. Kesulitan ini dapat terbaca karena di bagian lain MK mengatakan bahwa pilihan bentuk hukum ratifikasi perjanjian internasional dalam bentuk formil Undang-Undang perlu ditinjau kembali. Namun sayangnya, kesimpulan ini dibangun dari premis yang agak lain dan terkesan bahwa mengambil bentuk UU adalah sistem yang keliru.  Pilihan bentuk UU untuk persetujuan DPR bukan hal yang baru dalam praktek Negara-negara.  Belanda, Columbia, Jerman dan banyak Negara lainnya memilih bentuk formil UU untuk persetujuan DPR. Dalam hal ini, bukan bentuk formil UU ini yang menjadi akar masalah namun bagaimana MK memberi makna terhadap UU ini yang menjadi faktor penentu.

Di lain pihak terdapat pula argumentasi MK yang kelihatannya logis dari sisi hukum tatanegara namun menjadi tidak logis dalam  hukum internasional. Bagi MK, pemuatan Piagam ASEAN di Jakarta kedalam UU 38/2008 dinilai sebagai pemindahan format treaty kedalam format UU yang memiliki konsekuensi bahwa negara pihak (negara-negara ASEAN lainnya) harus terikat pada UU ini. Dalam hal ini MK berpendapat bahwa karena Piagam ASEAN mengambil bentuk Undang-Undang (yaitu UU No. 38/2008) dan karena UU berlaku sebagai norma hukum, maka negara Indonesia dan negara lain, dalam hal ini negara ASEAN wajib terikat secara hukum oleh UU No. 38/2008.[11]

MK sendiri mengakui bahwa konstruksi demikian tidak tepat. Namun persoalan yang muncul disini adalah apakah argumen yang dibangun untuk mencapai kesimpulan MK tsb telah tepat menggambarkan tentang apa hakekat UU No. 38/2008.  MK tampaknya meyakini bahwa sumber error ini adalah penggunaan UU sebagai format pengesahan Piagam ASEAN tanpa memperhatikan bahwa penggunaan format UU sangat lazim oleh negara-negara lain. Kesimpulan MK ini agak sulit difahami dan tampaknya tidak didukung secara akademis tentang prinsip umum tentang hubungan hukum internasional.  Piagam ASEAN adalah perjanjian internasional yang pembentukannya dilakukan dalam ranah hukum internasional, sedangkan UU No. 38/2008 adalah produk hukum nasional yang tunduk pada ranah ini. Piagam ASEAN berlaku bagi negara-negara ASEAN dalam ranah hukum internasional. Dituangkannya Piagam ASEAN kedalam UU nasionalnya adalah murni urusan Indonesia dan tidak ada kaitannya dengan negara-negara lain karena dengan atau tanpa UU ini, tidak akan mempengaruhi kekuatan mengikat Piagam ASEAN dalam ranah hukum internasional. Dalam hal ini, MK telah mengkonstruksikan suatu asumsi bahwa perbuatan legislasi Indonesia dapat mengikat negara-negara lain, suatu konstruksi yang sangat bertentangan dengan hukum internasional.

Kesulitan MK dalam memahami fungsi UU nasional dalam kerangka perjanjian internasional sebenarnya dapat dijelaskan melalu teori yang berlaku dalam hubungan hukum internasional dan hukum nasional. Dalam hal ini, hukum internasional dan hukum nasional adalah dua ranah hukum berbeda.  Namun dalam teori kedua bidang hukum ini dapat dilihat sebagai suatu kesatuan sistem (monisme) atau dua sistem yang terpisah (dualisme). Perjanjian internasional lahir dari ranah hukum internasional dan bagaimana mengikatnya diatur oleh hukum internasional (Konvensi Wina 1969 tentang Perjanjian Internasional). Namun bagaimana perjanjian ini mengikat secara internal di hukum negara masing-masing adalah persoalah HTN nasional.  Dalam hal ini, UU No. 38/2008  adalah persoalan HTN Indonesia bukan persoalan hukum internasional.

Fungsi UU No. 38/2008 seperti yang dibayangkan oleh MK sebenarnya dapat dijelaskan melalui doktrin transformasi yang merupakan turunan dari teori dualisme. Menurut doktrin ini, perjanjian internasional adalah norma hukum internasional yang mengikat negara sebagai subjek hukum internasional. Perjanjian ini tidak sendirinya berlaku dalam hukum nasional dan untuk diberlakukan dalam hukum nasional maka perlu proses transformasi kedalam hukum nasional dengan menjadikannya UU nasional. Dijadikannya perjanjian sebagai UU nasional sama sekali tidak mempengaruhi status perjanjian internasional sebagai dokumen yang mengikat negara di ranah hukum internasional. Teori transformasi menjelaskan bahwa Piagam ASEAN dalam formatnya sebagai Treaty mengikat semua negara pihak dalam tataran hukum internasoinal, sedangkan UU 38/2008 (jika hendak dianggap sebagai UU transformasi) adalah menjadikan Piagam ASEAN menjadi UU nasional dan bertujuan hanya untuk mengikat subjek-subjek dalam hukum nasional. Menurut teori ini, pemuatan Piagam ASEAN ke dalam format UU 38/2008 adalah murni urusan hukum nasional dan tidak ada sangkut pautnya dengan status Piagam sebagai treaty menurut hukum internasional. Artinya sekalipun Piagam ASEAN telah menjadi UU Nasional, statusnya sebagai perjanjian internasional  tidak berubah dan tetap mengikat negara pihak lainnya sebagai subjek hukum internasional.

Namun terlepas dari itu, dilema yang timbul  akibat dituangkannya Piagam ASEAN kedalam UU,  telah mendorong MK untuk menyarankan agar pilihan bentuk UU untuk Perjanjian Internasional ditinjau kembali. Dengan saran ini terdapat MK mengindikasikan bahwa seyogianya perjanjian internasional tidak dapat diuji oleh MK. Namun dapat-tidaknya perjanjian internasional diuji oleh pengadilan nasional  hanya dapat dijawab jika politik hukum tentang status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional sudah ditetapkan. Sayangnya UUD 45 yang telah diubah di era reformasi ini tidak menyediakan politik hukum ini. MK berusaha mengisi sebagian kekosongan konstitutional ini melaui saran tsb. Menurut penulis, saran MK ini harus ditindaklanjuti dengan amandemen Pasal 11 UUD 45 karena materi putusan MK ini adalah materi Konstitusi.

3. Konsekuensi Juridis dari Keputusan MK

Jika perjanjian internasional dapat di judicial review oleh MK maka dalam hal MK menyatakan perjanjian tsb bertentangan dengan UUD 45, bagaimana nasib kewajiban internasional Indonesia terhadap negara pihak lainnya? Terhadap pertanyaan ini MK mengeluarkan dalil yang tampkanya sangat cekak dengan prinsip hukum internasional yang belaku umum. Menurut MK:

‘Sekalipun Indonesia telah terikat dalam suatu perjanjian internasional, namun sebagai sebuah negara yang berdaulat Negara Indonesia tetap mempunyai hak secara mandiri (unilateral) untuk menarik diri dari perjanjian itu.’ Selanjutnya MK mengatakan bahwa hal ini dimungkinkan dengan  ketentuan Pasal 18 huruf h Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2000 tentang Perjanjian Internasional yang menyatakan, “Perjanjian internasional berakhir apabila: … h. terdapat hal-hal yang merugikan kepentingan nasional”.[12]

Doktrin kedaulatan Negara ini sangat dikenal dalam politik internasional dan pernah berkembang pada periode awal abad ke 20 dalam hukum internasional yang dikenal dengan doktrin primat hukum nasional atas hukum internasional. Namun sayangnya doktrin kedaulatan absolut ini sudah dikikis oleh hukum internasional yang berlaku dewasa ini. Konvensi Wina 1969 tentang perjanjian internasional telah mengatur secara ketat bagaimana suatu Negara dapat menarik diri dari suatu perjanjian dan tidak lagi membuka ruang bagi tindakan unilateral penarikan diri sepanjang tindakan itu disetejui oleh para pihak perjanjian. Selain itu, Konvensi ini melarang Negara mengingkari perjanjian dengan menggunakan tameng hukum nasionalnya. Indonesia pernah melakukan tindakan unilateral ini pada saat menarik diri secara sepihak dari kenggotaan PBB pada tahun 1965 namun hukum internasional tidak pernah mengakui sebagai penarikan diri yang sah, karena Piagam PBB tidak membuka ruang bagi penarikan diri sepihak. Seorang pakar hukum, Egon Schwelb, menyebut penarikan diri Indonesia ini sebagai ‘the Indonesian Intermezzo’. ^[13]

Terlebih lagi, prinsip seperti yang dimaksud MK ini jelas tidak bisa lagi diterapkan. Indonesia tidak mungkin membatalkan sepihak perjanjian perbatasannya dengan Negara tetangga dengan dalih kepentingan nasional. Sebaliknya, Indonesia tidak mengharapkan Negara tetangga membatalkan perjanjian batas yang telah ada selama ini karena akan berpotensi pada konflik antar Negara. Bahkan, menurut Konvensi Wina, ‘perubahan fundamental’ pun tidak dapat dijadikan alasan untuk mengakhiri perjanjian perbatasan.[14]

Dalil MK ini akan membuka boks pandora tentang perjanjian-perjanjian perbatasan yang telah diratifikasi oleh Indonesia melalui UU karena secara konstitutional dapat dianulir oleh MK dan akan melahirkan wanprestasi di ranah hukum internasional. Situasi ini akan menggiring Indonesia ke dilema hukum, yaitu pentaatan terhadap hukum nasional akan melahirkan pelanggaran terhadap hukum internasional dan sebaliknya pentaatan terhadap perjanjian mengakibatkan pelanggaran konstitusi. Dilema ini semakin sulit dalam konteks konstitusi karena Konvensi Wina 1969 telah terang-benderang melarang negara untuk berlindung dibalik hukum nasionalnya untuk tidak menaati perjanjian internasional.[15]

Negara-negara pada umumnya menghindari adanya judicial review terhadap perjanjian internasional mengingat adanya aspek hukum international pada setiap perjanjian ini. Alasan tradisional yang menghalangi negara untuk judical review ini adalah karena pengadilan nasional tidak mungkin menguji produk hukum internasional. Sekalipun negara mengharuskan adanya mekanisme pengujian perjanjian ini dengan alasan legitimasi konstitusional, pengujian ini dilakukan bukan terhadap perjanjian internasional namun terhadap UU yang mentransformasinya. Penganuliran oleh Peradilan terhadap UU transformasi ini tidak mengakibatkan perjanjian itu dianulir dalam ranah hukum internasional karena terdapat mekanisme hukum internasional untuk maksud itu. Sekalipun yang diuji adalah UU Transformasinya, negara tetap memperhatikan kepentingan internasional dan bukan sebaliknya. Jerman misalnya, mengakui mekanisme judicial review terhadap UU yang meratifikasi setelah UU dikeluarkan dan harus sebelum perjanjian itu berlaku di ranah hukum internasional.

4. Kesimpulan

Dari kajian atas keputusan MK diatas maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa MK masih belum memperjelas status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional Indonesia. MK telah menetapkan bahwa UU No. 38/2008 adalah UU yang mentransformasikan Piagam  ASEAN kedalam hukum nasional, namun kemudian menilainya tidak tepat dan menyarankan agar mempertimbangkan untuk menghapus pemakaian UU untuk suatu persetujuan DPR terhadap perjanjian. Di lain pihak, jika format UU itu dihapuskan,  MK tidak mengindikasikan apa-apa tentang apa konsekuensi selanjutnya jika perjanjian internasional telah mengikat. Apakah dapat berlaku langsung (monisme) atau masih dibutuhkan UU transformasi yang terpisah untuk memberlakukannya dalam hukum nasional (dualisme). Dalam kasus ini publik sebenarnya menantikan MK untuk memperjelas aliran hukum Indonesia tentang status perjanjian namun ternyata MK hanya membuat ‘janin’ aliran hukum itu secara sesaat namun tidak mengharapkan kelahirannya. Akademisi harus bersabar untuk menunggu jurisprudensi berikutnya.

Sebaliknya Keputusan MK telah melahirkan risiko hukum baru mengenai stabilitas perjanjian internasional oleh Indonesia. Terbukanya dasar hukum untuk menguji semua perjanjian internasional yang telah diratifikasi oleh Indonesia dengan UU oleh MK telah membuka boks pandora. Sewaktu-waktu dapat saja MK menganulir berlakunya perjanjian internasional yang pada akhirnya dapat mencederai kredibilitas Indonesia di mata negara pihak lainnya. Keputusan ini justru menimbulkan ketidakpastian hukum baru bagi status perjanjian internasional di dalam hukum nasional ketimbang memperjelasnya.

****

 

[1] Penulis adalah mantan Direktur Perjanjian Internasional, Kementerian Luar Negeri RI dan saat ini bertugas sebagai Konsul Jenderal RI di Frankfurt. Artikel ini murni pandangan akademis penulis.

[2] Diskusi tentang persoalan status perjanjian internasional dalam hukum nasional telah dibahas penulis dalam buku “Hukum Perjanjian Internasional: Kajian Kritis Praktek dan Teori di Indonesia, Refika, Bandung, 2010.

[3] John Austin adalah pakar Inggris yang mengatakan bahwa ‘International Law is not a real Law, but a positive International Morality’, John Austin, “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined”,  127 (Hart Ed. 1954).

[4] MA, PT. Nizwar v. Navigation Maritime Bulgare (NMB), No. 2944 K/Pdt/1983.  Perdebatan ini dapat dilihat pada M. Yahya Harahap, Arbitrase (2006), 19; Sudargo Gautama, Indonesia dan Arbitrase Internasional (1986), 72; T.M. Radhie, Konvensi New York tentang Pengakuan Pelaksanaan Putusan Arbitrase Luar Negeri, Jakarta (1990), 24.

[5] Sejak tahun 2006, Kementerian Luar Negeri menggelar rangkaian Focussed Group Discussion yang dihadiri oleh pakar hukum tata negara dan hukum internasional guna membahas tentang status perjanjian internasional dalam system hukum nasional, yaitu di FH Universitas Andalas (1 Juli 2006), FH UI ( 11 Desember 2007), FH Unair (18-19 Oktober 2008), dan FH Unpad (29 November 2008).

[6] Lihat pandangan Prof. Romly Atmasasmia, “Aplikasi UNCAC ke sistem hukum pidana nasional”, Koran Sindo, 14 Juni 2013.  http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/2013/06/14/18/749740/aplikasi-uncac-ke-sistem-hukum-pidana-nasional

[7] MK, Nomor 33/PUU-IX/2011.

[8] Para 3.4, MK, Nomor 33/PUU-IX/2011.

[9] Utrecht, E/Moh. Saleh Djindang, Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia, Ichtiar Baru, Jakarta, dicetak kembali tahun 1983, 120.

[10] Hakim Konstitusi Hamdan Zoleva dan Maria Farida Indrati.

[11] Para 2.23.

[12] Para 3. 18.

[13] Egon Schwelb, ‘Withdrawal from the United Nations: the Indonesian Intermezzo’, 61 AJIL (1967), 661-672; Penarikan diri Indonesia dari PBB oleh Sekjen PBB diistilahkan dengan ‘suspension’ dan sejak 1966 Indonesia kembali beraktivitas di PBB namun tetap wajib membayar kontribusi selama ‘keluar’ dari PBB, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, ‘Pengantar Hukum Internasional’, 89-99.

[14] Pasal 62 (2) Konvensi Wina 1969 tentang Perjanjian Internasional.

[15] Pasal 27 Konvensi Wina 1969.